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OWEN McINTYRE*

The Role of Customary Rules and
Principles of International
Environmental Law in the Protection
of Shared International Freshwater
Resources
ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding the recent elaboration of a number of global and
regional conventional instruments expressly concerned with the
environmental protection of international watercourses, certain
rules and principles of customary international law have
developed in recent decades that continue to have a significant
role to play in this regard. In recent years, debate has raged over
the precise legal status and normative content of many
internationalenvironmental norms and principles, some of which
are often assumed to enjoy binding force in customary
international law. While some commentators characterise these
norms as "declarative" rather than customary law, suggesting
that their usefulness may be limited in relation to third-party
dispute settlement by courts and arbitral tribunals, this
characterisationpossibly ignores the fact that such norms have an
important role to play in terms of voluntary compliance and in
terms of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Further, certain
international environmental norms contained in treaty
instruments, though declaratory in nature, can be expected to
play a significant role in informing the rules and principles, in
particular those relating to the equitable and reasonable
utilisationof watercourses and the prevention of significantharm
to other watercourse States. More specifically, trends identified
both in the treaty practice of States and in soft law guidelines
defined by international institutions can be taken into
consideration to define more concretely the material contents of
"due diligence." Of course, the consistent inclusion of normative
rules and principles in the declarations and resolutions of
international organisations contributes significantly to the
process of custom generation. This process might be expected to
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have made a particularly significant contribution to the
development of internationalenvironmental law where the use of
soft law declaratory instruments has been so widespread. The
single most important source of rules and principles that may
have crystallised into generally binding norms of customary
international environmental law is the accumulated corpus of
relevant multilateral and bilateral treaty provisions, many of
which contain elaborate environmental rules. In turn, the
inclusion of certain rules and principles in treaties must greatly
enhance their status as established or emerging rules of general
customary law. This article outlines the results of an extensive
survey of international conventions and soft law instruments,
State, judicial and arbitral practice, and academic commentary
relating to the normative development and substantive content of
each of these purported customary environmental rules and
principles and to their application in the area of sharedfreshwater
resources. Ultimately, it aims to highlight the role of such rules
and principles in ensuring, by means of their detailed elaboration
and normative sophistication, that an appropriate weighting is
allocated to considerations of environmental protection in
determining an equitable regime for the utilisation of shared
international water resources under well-established rules of
internationalwater law.
I. INTRODUCTION
International law relating to the utilisation of shared freshwater
resources has become much clearer in recent years. The principle of
"equitable utilisation" is the pre-eminent rule relating to the utilisation of
international watercourses. According to this rule, the determination of a
reasonable and equitable regime for the utilisation of an international
watercourse is usually understood in terms of a number of familiar
relevant factors or criteria.' However, among the various factors
1. For example, Article 6(1) of the 1997 Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly &
opened to signature May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter U.N. Convention], and Article
V(2) of the International Law Association's 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 783-84 (A.H.
Garretson et al. eds., 1967) both emphasise the following factors as relevant in determining
whether the regime of allocation of uses and/or quantum-share of waters of a shared
freshwater resource is reasonable and equitable:
* the social and economic needs of the watercourse States;
* the population dependent on the watercourse;
* the existing and potential uses of the waters;
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impacting upon application of this principle, it is arguable that
considerations relating to the environmental protection of international
watercourses are steadily increasing in terms of their significance and
complexity. This is largely due to the emergence in general and
customary international law of a comprehensive suite of rules,
principles, and legal concepts requiring enhanced protection of various
aspects of the natural environment of international watercourses and
riparian States. The normative content of such rules and principles is
becoming more clearly defined, both through their ongoing elaboration
into a sophisticated corpus of legal requirements and through growing
understanding of their mutual relevance. Indeed, it can be argued that
the normative sophistication and comprehensive coverage of general
environmental rules give added "voice" to environmental concerns
within the determination of a reasonable and equitable regime for the
utilisation of an international watercourse. In addition, these rules and
principles are increasingly supported by sophisticated rules of
procedure, adding further to their normative clarity and justiciability.
This article is based on a detailed survey and analysis of
declaratory and conventional instruments, judicial and arbitral practice,
recorded State practice, codifications by intergovernmental agencies and
learned associations, and academic commentary relating to a number of
established and emerging rules and principles of substantive and
procedural international environmental law. These substantive rules
include the duty to prevent transboundary pollution, the duty to cooperate, the duty to conduct transboundary environmental impact
assessments, the doctrine of sustainable development, the principle of
intergenerational equity, the principle of common but differentiated
responsibility, the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle,
and the ecosystems approach. The procedural rules include the duty to
notify, duties relating to the ongoing exchange of information, the duties
to consult and to negotiate in good faith, the duty to warn, and duties
relating to the settlement of disputes.
The author examines the likely status of each rule or principle in
customary international law and its likely normative content. He then
investigates the extent to which each of these rules has been applied to
the law on international watercourses in particular, and whether and
how each has been incorporated into key conventional instruments on
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Further, he
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the efficiency of actual or planned utilisations;
the effects on other watercourse States;
the availability of alternative sources; and
certain physical geographical characteristics of the watercourse.
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attempts to elaborate upon the likely impact of each rule or principle in
relation to the significance of environmental considerations within the
overarching doctrine of equitable utilisation of international watercourses.
It is entirely beyond the scope of this article to set out detailed
conclusions regarding all the rules and principles of international
environmental law that impact upon the utilisation of international
watercourses. Rather, it will highlight very briefly a number of such
rules and principles, both substantive and procedural, that have been
articulated in recent highly influential conventions and will point out
their practical relevance for the environmental protection of international
watercourses. The author argues that the wide international acceptance
and normative specificity and sophistication of the evolving rules of
general international environmental law, coupled with the existence of
institutional machinery for their elaboration and
competent
implementation, give environmental considerations greater "voice" and,
thus, greater relative significance in the determination of a reasonable
and equitable regime for the utilisation of international watercourses.
II. SUBSTANTIVE RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In addition to the provisions of the 1997 U.N. Convention on the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 2 and other
conventional provisions, a number of customary international legal rules
and principles have developed in recent decades that might play a role
in the environmental protection of international watercourses. The
existence of and, to a lesser degree, the normative status of these rules
and principles have largely been defined by "the progressive gathering
of recurrent treaty provisions, recommendations made by international
organizations, resolutions adopted at the end of international

2. U.N. Convention, supra note 1 (Treaty not yet in force). While 103 States approved
the 1997 Resolution to adopt the Convention, ratifications remain insufficient to bring it
into force. Under Article 36 of the U.N. Convention, entry into force requires 35
instruments of ratification, acceptance, accession, or approval, but as of July 2002, only 12
States were party to the Convention. Id. at 715. The status of the Treaty as of October 5,
2005, may be found at http://intemationalwaterlaw.orgfLntlDocs/Watercourse_status.htm. Though
the Convention has not entered into force, it is likely to remain highly influential and
persuasive as a statement of current customary and general international law on
watercourses as it is the culmination of over 20 years of in-depth research by the
International Law Commission into the state of international watercourse law and practice.
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conferences, and other texts that can be said to have influenced State
3
practice."
Such rules include the obligation to prevent transboundary
pollution and the rules relating to responsibility and liability for such
pollution, the obligation to co-operate, and the requirement for
environmental impact assessment for projects having transboundary
effects. These customary principles include the precautionary principle,
sustainable development, intergenerational equity, and common-butdifferentiated responsibility. Other emerging principles may eventually
form part of the corpus of relevant customary international
environmental law, including the so-called "ecosystems approach." 4 The
key significance of such rules and principles is that, as they represent the
accumulated legal expression of environmental protection concerns by
the international community, they indicate which issues will likely be
identified and articulated as central in the environmental protection of
international rivers and the means by which such issues will be
considered. The normative content of the rules and principles of
customary and general international law on the environment is likely to
inform the interpretation and application of the rules and principles that
are outlined in the environmental provisions of the 1997 Convention and
other relevant instruments. Indeed, it is later submitted that it is largely
by virtue of the very sophistication and extensive elaboration of these
substantive and procedural rules and principles of general international
environmental law that environmental considerations will be such a
prominent factor in determining an equitable regime for the utilisation of
shared freshwater resources.
Customary international law will continue to play a significant
residual role in the settlement of international environmental disputes
concerning shared water resources as it may apply to States that are not
party to the 1997 Convention or other conventional arrangements or to
disputes between State parties that are not covered by the Convention
due to the use of reservations. Indeed, even the U.N. General Assembly
recognised that most situations were covered by customary, not
conventional, international law, despite the existence of numerous
treaties governing the use of particular international rivers, before

3. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding
International Pollution, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 61, 61 (Daniel Barstow
Magraw ed., 1991).
4. For a discussion of each of the abovementioned rules and principles, see infra.
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referring the topic of the non-navigational uses of international
5
watercourses to the International Law Commission for codification.
In recent years, debate has raged over the precise legal status of
many international environmental norms and principles that are often
assumed to enjoy binding force in customary international law. Taking
an examination of actual State behaviour as the basis for determining
whether a norm is part of customary law, Daniel Bodansky notably
concludes that, "[a]ccording to the orthodox account of customary
international law, few principles of international environmental law
qualify as customary." 6 Regarding the prohibition on transboundary
harm, the precautionary principle and the duty to notify, he observes
that, with the possible exception of the International Law Commission
and some work of the International Law Association, legal writers'
assertions about customary international law are not based on surveys of
State behaviour but on the utilisation of texts produced by States and by
non-State actors, such as courts, arbitral panels, intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations, and legal scholars. 7 Such texts include
cases, statutes, treaties, codifications, resolutions, and declarations.
Therefore, Bodansky characterises these norms as "declarative" 8 rather
than customary law but concedes that, while their usefulness may be
limited in relation to third-party dispute settlement by courts and
arbitral tribunals, such norms can play an important role in terms of
voluntary compliance and bilateral and multilateral negotiations. 9
Indeed, as courts and arbitral tribunals play, at least as yet,1° a relatively

5. See The Secretary General, Survey of International Law-Working Paper prepared
by the Secretary-General in the light of the decision of the Commission to review its
programme of work, 285, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245 (Apr. 23, 1971), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 61-62 (1971). See also Gerhard Hafner & Holly L. Pearson, Environmental Issues
in the Work of the InternationalLaw Commission, 11 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (2000).
6. Daniel Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental
Law, 3 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 112 (1995). See also Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty
Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEx. INT'L. L.J. 87 (1991);
N.C.H. Dunbar, The Myth of Customary InternationalLaw, 8 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1978-80).
7. Bodansky, supranote 6, at 113.
8. Id. at 116. See also Chodosh, supra note 6.
9. Bodansky, supra note 6, at 117-19. See also Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of
Compliance Control in InternationalEnvironmentalTreaties, 13 COLO. J.INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
377 (2002). See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); see especially

Alexandre Kiss, Commentary and Conclusions, id. at 223-42.
10. Bodansky, supra note 6, at 117. Bodansky speculates that "[tihe establishment of an
environmental chamber of the International Court of Justice and the recent cases between
Nauru and Australia and between Hungary and Slovakia may signal the emergence of a
greater judicial role." Id. Similarly, Judge Stephen Schwebel has noted that "a greater range
of international legal forums is likely to mean that more disputes are submitted to
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minor role in the resolution of international environmental disputes,
"declarative" norms can play a very significant role by exerting a
compliance pull on States" and, more importantly, by influencing
2
negotiations and other second-party control mechanisms.
Further, these "declaratory" international environmental norms
can be expected to play a significant role in informing the rules and
principles contained in the 1997 Convention and other treaty
instruments. As Pierre-Marie Dupuy points out,
A number of guidelines emitted by these bodies
[international institutions, both intergovernmental and, at a
lower stage, non-governmental (e.g., the Institut de Droit
Internationale, the International Law Association, and the
International Union for Conservation of Nature)] have
penetrated gradually into contemporary State practice. In
certain cases, these guidelines bring an important
contribution to the definition of international standards on

international judicial settlement. The more international adjudication there is, the more
there is likely to be; the 'judicial habit' may stimulate healthy imitation." Statements of
Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, to the 54th
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.39, at 3 (Oct. 26, 1999)."[I]ncrease in recourse to the
Court [International Court of Justice] is likely to endure, at any rate if a state of relative
detente in international relations endures." Statements of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel,
President of the International Court of Justice, U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.44, at 4 (Oct. 27, 1998).
For a discussion on the background to the establishment of the Special Environment
Chamber of the International Court of Justice and the growing number of environmental
cases coming before the Court, see Maglosia Fitzmaurice, Environmental Protection and the
International Court of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 293, 305-14 (Vaughan Lowe & Maglosia
Fitzmaurice eds., 1996). In relation to the Commission of Mediation, Arbitration, and
Conciliation of the Organisation of African Unity, see T.O. Elias, The Charter of the
OrganizationofAfrican Unity, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 243, 263-64 (1965).
11. See Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 41-42 (1990);
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success of InternationalEnvironmental Law, 3 IND.
J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995).
12. Bodansky concludes that
the biggest potential influence of these norms is on second-party control
mechanisms. Most international environmental issues are resolved
through mechanisms such as negotiations, rather than through third-party
dispute settlement or unilateral changes of behaviour. In this second-party
control process, international environmental norms can play a significant
role by setting the terms of the debate, providing evaluative standards,
serving as a basis to criticize other states' actions, and establishing a
framework of principles within which negotiations may take place to
develop more specific norms, usually in treaties.
Bodansky, supra note 6, at 118-19.
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the basis of which the due diligence to be expected from
"well-governed" modem States can be established.1 3
More specifically, Dupuy suggests that both trends identified in treaty
practice and soft law guidelines defined by international institutions can
be taken into consideration "to define more concretely the material
' 14
contents of 'due diligence."
Of course, the consistent inclusion of normative rules and
principles in the declarations and resolutions of international
organisations, and of the United Nations in particular, contributes
significantly to the process of custom generation. In relation to repeated
pronouncements in U.N. resolutions and declarations, Judge Tanaka
commented in his dissenting opinion in the South West Africa Case
(Second Phase), "This collective, cumulative and organic process of
custom generation can be characterised as the middle way between
legislation by convention and the traditional process of custom making
and can be seen to have an important role from the viewpoint of
development of international law." 15 This process might have made a
particularly significant contribution to the development of international
environmental law where the use of soft law declaratory instruments has
been so widespread. Though some prominent commentators maintain
that, in relation to the formation of custom, "what states do is more
important than what they say," 16 others, notably Michael Akehurst,
criticise this distinction between the "material components" and other
"elements" of "practice," noting that "it is artificial to try to distinguish
between what a state does and what it says." 17 Indeed, Harold Hohmann

13. Dupuy, supra note 3. Dupuy further concludes that "[s]oft law [international
directives or undertakings that are not, strictly speaking, binding in themselves] must be
taken into account in the tentative analysis and interpretation of what is certainly already
'hard law,' that is, international directives or undertakings that are binding of their own
accord under international law." Id. at 62.
14. Id. at 69. In the context of the duty placed on States under international law to
prevent transboundary harm by means of pollution, "due diligence" generally refers to a
relative obligation as to performance, based on reasonable standards of care and prudence,
rather than an absolute obligation as to result.
15. South-West Africa Case (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J 248, 292 (July
18).
16. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly on
Customary International Law, 73 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 301, 302 (1979). In support of this
view, see ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-91

(1971). See generally H. Meijers, On InternationalCustomary Law in the Netherlands, in ON THE
FOUNDATIONS AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-84 (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G.
Post eds., 2003).
17. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, in 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1,
3 (1974-75).
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notes that, like "no other area of international law [international
environmental law] is influenced by such a multitude of guidelines,
resolutions and other declarations," the grouping of which documents
"in the category of soft law (in contrast to hard law) does not do justice
to the peculiarities of modem ways of making international environmental law." 18 In his view, to identify customary law, State practice may
be reduced to diplomatic practice where the following three criteria are
fulfilled:
(1) the values at the basis of the resolutions concerned are
shared by all States -and all States see the need to establish
the legal rule quickly;
(2) there must be an absence of pre-existing customary law
to be displaced; and
(3) there should be limited evidence of (external) State
practice. 19
Hohmann sees the primary role of soft-law instruments in the
identification of custom as that of "the solidifying of indicators for a
documentation of the opinio juris" of States.20 However, he also points
out that
the establishment of duties of customary law has also
occurred through agreements.. .if indications exist for the
formation of opinio juris, if an agreement adopts this rule, if
the rule can be generalized and if it is contained in a global
agreement or in at least two regional agreements of two
21
different regions.
Thus, "rules of customary law initiated through declarations find their
way into agreements and vice versa." 22
One view attaches significance to declaratory instruments in
explaining the elusive distinction between general principles of
international law and rules of customary international law. According to
Alfred Verdross,
The difference between the creation of a principle of law
and that of a customary rule lies therefore in the fact that in

18. HAROLD HOHMANN, PRECAUTIONARY LEGAL DuTIEs AND PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 335 (1994).
19.

Id. at 335 n.12.

20.

Id. at 336.

21.
22.

Id. at 337.
Id.
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the latter case, the opinio juris expresses itself in the
constant practice of States, while in the former case, the
principle of law is born at the moment when it is expressly
recognised by the States within or outside the General
Assembly. 23
Katia Boustany points out that the actual implementation of such
principles can transform them into customary rules, 24 in which case
"they do not disappear, but are hidden by customary rules with the
same content." 25
At any rate, the corpus of relevant multilateral and bilateral
treaty provisions comprises the single most important source of rules
and principles that may actually have crystallised into generally binding
norms of customary international environmental law. Explaining the role
of the International Court of Justice in this process, Sir Robert Jennings
declared, in a statement made to representatives gathered during the
proceedings of the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, that it is "a principal task of the ICJ to decide, applying wellestablished rules and criteria, whether the provisions of multilateral
treaties have or have not developed from merely contractual rules into
rules of general customary international law." 26
Of course, the consistent inclusion of a normative provision in
bilateral treaties also provides significant evidence of acceptance of a rule
in international law. In relation to shared water resources in particular,
by 1963, a U.N. publication listed 253 treaties on non-navigational uses of
international rivers. 27 In 1974, another U.N. document identified a
further 52 bilateral and multilateral agreements that had been concluded
in the intervening period. 28 Clearly, this reservoir of treaty practice
greatly assisted the International Law Commission in the elaboration of
the 1994 Draft Articles, which formed the basis of the 1997 Convention
23. Katia Boustany, The Development of Nuclear Law-Making or the Art of Legal "Evasion,"
61 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 39, 42 (1998) (quoting Alfred Verdross, Les principes ginirauxde droit
dans le syst&me des sources du droit international,in MILANGES GUGGENHEIM 521, 526 (1968)).
24. Id.
25.

Id. (quoting NGUYEN Quoc DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 345 (1994)).

26. See Sir Robert Jennings, Need for Environmental Court?, 22 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 312, 313
(1992); Fitzmaurice, supra note 10, at 300 (citation omitted).
27. U.N. Legislative Series, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions Concerning the
Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
LER.B/12 (1974). See also Charles Odidi Okidi, Preservationand Protection Under the 1991 ILC
Draft Articles on the Law of InternationalWatercourses, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 143,
144 (1992).
28. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Legal Problems Relating to
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, prepared during the 26th Sess. of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/274 (1974). See also Okidi, supra note 27.
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and led State actors and intergovernmental bodies to argue that there are
principles of international law that can be applied to the preservation
and environmental protection of international watercourses in the
absence of bilateral and multilateral agreements. 29 In turn, the inclusion
of certain rules and principles in the International Law Commission
(ILC) Draft Articles, and subsequently in the Convention, must greatly
enhance their status as established or emerging rules of general
customary law, particularly in light of the ILC's function within the U.N.
system and the cautious approach taken to its role of progressive
development of international law, tempered by the constraints imposed
30
by the reality of international State practice.
In recent years, commentators have recognized the increasingly
significant role that multilateral development banks (MDBs), such as the
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and other development agencies can play in
31
implementing sustainable development standards and principles.
Indeed, Ginther Handl argues that MDBs are legally obliged, even
though their charters may not include explicit environmental obligations
or mandates, to act in accordance with international environmental
norms possessing the status of customary international law or general
principles of law. 32 He argues that this obligation may require not only
avoiding lending to projects that may cause environmental harm, but
also a more positive obligation "to act affirmatively toward realising the
goals of sustainable development generally." 33 It is apparent that MDBs
routinely employ procedures for environmental impact assessment of
development proposals and influence the general economic policy of
borrower States by providing assistance in the development of national
environmental action plans and by other capacity-building measures.
Indeed, by May 2006, more than 40 of the world's leading commercial
banks had agreed to abide by the World Bank's voluntary code of ethical
standards when making loans for infrastructure projects, particularly in
29. See Report of the U.N. Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Argentina, at 115, U.N.
Doc. E/CONF.70/29 (1977). See also Okidi, supra note 27, at 159.
30. See Jutta Brunn4e & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater
Resources: A Casefor InternationalEcosystem Law, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 41, 58 (1994).
31. See generally GONTHER
HANDL, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKING:
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS REFLECTING GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY (2001); BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
THROUGH FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS (2002); AMix Gowlland Gualtieri, The Environmental
Accountability of the World Bank to Non-State Actors: Insightsfrom the Inspection Panel, 72 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 213, 213-15 (2001); Palitha T.B. Kohona, Implementing Global Standards- The
Emerging Role of the Non-State Sector, 34 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 260 (2004).

32.
33.

HANDL, supra note 31, at 13-19.
Id.at 31.
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less developed countries. 34 These banks agreed to follow strict rules for
lending to projects such as dams and oil pipelines that threaten the
environment and local livelihoods.
Similarly, international trade law plays an increasingly active
role in identifying and applying emerging rules of international environmental law in the course of international trade disputes. 35 For example,
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Appellate Body recently endorsed
the concept of "sustainable development" 36 as a general objective of
international law in the Shrimp-Turtle case, 37 while, in the Beef Hormones
case,38 it incorporated elements of the so-called "precautionary
principle" 39 into the WTO Agreement 4° and thus into the very fabric of
the international trading system.

34. See The Paper Industry: Trouble at Mill, THE ECONOMIST, May 20, 2006, at 68. The
International Finance Corporation, the private sector lending arm of the World Bank
Group, developed the so-called "Equator Principles," available at http://www.ifc.org/
equatorprinciples, which are applicable to project financing and have already been cited in
the context of a number of disputes, including those concerning the Karahnjukar Power
Plant in Iceland and the Baku-Thlisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project. See Kohona, supra note 31.
35.

See generallyENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND MARKET MECHANISMS (Klaus Bosselman

& Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2001).
36. "Sustainable development" is commonly understood as "development that meets
the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs." See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS, BROCHURE ON JOHANNESBURG SUMMrr 2002:
WORLD SUMMrr ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, available at http://
www.johannesburgsumrmit.org/html/brochure/brochure12.pdf. Detailed principles for
the achievement of sustainable development were set down in the Rio Declaration adopted
by the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development, including, inter alia, Principle
3, which provides, "The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations." Report of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14,
1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/confl5l/aconfl5l26-lannexl.htm [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
37. Appellate Body Report, US-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
38. Appellate Body Report, Measures Concerning Meat and Bone Products,
120-25
(1998).
39. See Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 36, which provides, "In order to
protect the environment, the precautionary principle shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation." See Rio Declaration, supra note 36.
40. See Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 13 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legale/ursum_e.htm#
Agreement (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
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Conclusions Regarding Substantive Rules
It is widely accepted that there is an obligation to prevent
transboundary harm by means of pollution. This obligation receives
support from the vast majority of academic commentators 41 in judicial
and arbitral statements, 42 in leading declarations and resolutions
adopted by the international community, 43 in codifications of
41. See PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
104-05 (2002); Dupuy, supra note 3, at 63; ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 130 (1991); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 190 (1995); EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 317 (1992); Sanford E. Gaines, Taking
Responsibilityfor Transboundary Environmental Effects, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 781,
796-97 (1991); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 345
(1998); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two Steps
Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599, 620 (1995); Rudiger Wolfrum,
Purposes and Principles of International Environmental Law, 33 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 308, 309
(1990). For a more sceptical view, see John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J.INT'L L. 291, 293 (2002); Oliver Schachter, The
Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 457, 463 (1991); Bodansky,
supra note 6, at 110-11.
42. See Law of Non-NavigationalUses of InternationalWatercourses, 1974 U.N.Y.B. 194, 197
1065, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l (Part 2); Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v.
Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Nov. 16, 1957); Corfu Channel, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Dec. 5);
Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941) (though Bodansky is
quick to point out that this decision is merely one of an arbitration panel and that "after
more than fifty years [it] is still the only case in which a state was held internationally
responsible for causing transboundary harm," supra note 6, at 114); Case Concerning the
Gab&jkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25); Advisory Opinion on the Legality or Threat
of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 I.L.R. 809, 29 (1996); Requestfor an Examinationof the Situation
in Accordance with Paragraph63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. Pleadings 288 (Sept. 22, 1995). See also Charles B. Bourne, The Case
Concerning the Gabhikovo-Nagymaros Project: An Important Milestone in International Water
Law, 8 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL L. 6 (1997); Owen McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International
Rivers, Case Analysis of the ICJ Judgment in the Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia),10 J.ENVrL L. 79, 79-91 (1998).
43. See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
adopted at Stockholm, Swed. June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972),
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Stockholm Declaration]; G.A. Res. 3129
(XXVIII),U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30A, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add.1 (1973); G.A.
Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974),
reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1974). 1974 OECD Recommendation on the Control of
Eutrophication of Waters, OECD Council Recommendation C(74)220, reprinted in OECD,
OECD and the Environment (1986), at 44-45; OECD Recommendation on Strategies for
Specific Pollutants Control, OECD Council Recommendation C(74)221. OECD Recommendation on Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Council Recommendation C(74)224. Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Helsinki, Fin., Aug. 1, 1975, Final Act, reprinted in
14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975). Principle 3 of the 1978 UNEP Principles of Conduct in the Field of the
Environment Concerning Resources Shared by Two or More States, UNEP/IG/12/2 (1978) (also
known as UNEP Principles on Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources
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international law adopted by intergovernmental agencies 44 and learned
associations, 45 and in a number of normative environmental treaty
regimes.46 However, few who support the status of this obligation as a
rule of customary international law would argue that it prohibits all
transboundary harm. 47 This rule is subject to a number of considerable
limitations, including the fact that the prohibition is normally
understood to reflect an obligation as to performance, based on
standards of "due diligence," rather than an absolute obligation as to
result. 48 Also, it is clear that the duty to prevent harm by pollution is the
primary or cardinal rule of customary international environmental law,
despite the uncertainty of its precise normative content.
This duty to prevent harm has given rise to many, if not all, of
the other relevant rules and principles and is significantly informed by
the requirements of these other rules. For example, the duty to cooperate, though largely embodying procedural requirements to notify,
Shared by Two or More States, reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND

THE ENVIRONMENT 21 (P.W. Birnie & A.E. Boyle eds., 1995); Ass'n of SE Asian Nations,
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, arts. 10, 11 (July 9, 1985),
at http://www.aseansec.org/1490.htm; Rio Declaration, supra note 36, principle 2.
44. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission, May 6-July 26, 1996; Report
of the Working Group on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. GAOR A/51/10(SUPP) (1996). See also
Report of the International Law Commission, Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001,
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, U.N. Doc. GAOR A/56/10
(2001); SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-85 (Alan Boyle & David

Freestone eds., 1999) [hereinafter Report on Transboundary Harm]; The Secretary-General,
Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, 97-99, U.N. Doc. A/CN/.4/394
(July 5, 1985).
45. For example, Article 3(1) of the International Law Association's Montreal Rules of
International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution, Int'l L. Ass'n, Report of the 60th
Conference (1982), at 1-3.
46. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 194(2), 21 I.L.M. 1261
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). See also 1992 Espoo Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents, art. 192(2), 31 I.L.M. 1333 (1992); Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, Fin., Feb. 25, 1991,
1989 U.N.T.S. 310 (1997), 30 1.L.M. 800 (1991) (entered into force Sept. 10, 1997); Convention
on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 3, 31 I.L.M. 822 (1992) (entered into force Dec. 29,
1993); Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, 31 I.L.M. 851 (1992).
47. For an example of one of the very few commentators who continue to argue that
the prohibition applies to all transboundary harm, see Gaines, supranote 41, at 796-97.
48. See Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious
Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 1, 14-15 (1990); Riccardo-Pisillo-Mazzeschi, Forms of International Responsibility
for Environmental Harm, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 15,

24 (Francesco Francioni & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 1991); Gunther Handl, National Uses of
Transboundary Air Resources: The International Entitlement Issue Reconsidered, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 405, 429 (1986).
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exchange information, consult, and negotiate, is absolutely central to the
discharge of the due diligence standards of the obligation to prevent
harm. Equally, transboundary environmental impact assessment (EIA) is
central to practical discharge of the duty to notify of planned projects
and thus to effective co-operation. Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle have
noted that "without the benefit of an EIA the duty to notify and consult
other states in cases of transboundary risk will in many cases be
meaningless." 49 Though the 1997 U.N. Convention does not expressly
require an EIA before the implementation of planned projects or
activities that may have a significant effect, Phoebe Okowa suggests that
"it is nevertheless arguable that even in those instances where no specific
provision is made, environmental impact assessment may be taken to be
implicit in other procedural duties, in particular the duty to notify other
50
States of proposed activities that may entail transboundary harm."
Transboundary environmental impact assessment has also been linked to
the general principle of non-discrimination, 51 as have dispute settlement
procedures that give priority to private recourse by adversely affected
individuals to domestic courts and remedies in the avoidance and
resolution of disputes over international watercourses. Such procedures
can also be seen to give effect to the polluter pays principle.
In turn, the precautionary principle can play a vital role by
identifying when a transboundary EIA would be necessary and then
comprehensively setting out all the environmental risks inherent in a
planned project. The use of anticipatory EIA procedures is one of the key
means to give practical effect to the more obscure precautionary
principle. 52 Outside of formal EIA procedures, the precautionary
49.

BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 41, at 131. The same authors conclude that
[t]he basic proposition that states must cooperate in avoiding adverse
affects on their neighbours through a system of impact assessment,
notification, consultation, and negotiation appears generally to be
endorsed by the relevant jurisprudence, the declarations of international
bodies, and the work of the ILC. Moreover, as the Lac Lanoux arbitration
and the Nuclear Tests cases indicate, it also enjoys some support in state
practice.
Id. at 126.
50. Phoebe N. Okowa, Procedural Obligations in InternationalEnvironmental Agreements,
67 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 275, 279 (1996).
51. Knox, supra note 41, at 293. Knox similarly concludes that "Principle 21 does seem
logically to require.. .transboundary environmental impact assessment. Otherwise, the
substantive prohibition on transboundary harm would be largely meaningless, except
perhaps as a basis for post hoc determination of compensation owed to the affected state."
Id. at 295-96.
52. In his separate opinion, Judge Weeramantry expressly describes EIA as "a specific
application of the larger general principle of caution." Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3, 113 (Feb. 5) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry). See also
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principle plays a role in identifying general standards of due diligence
for the purposes of the duty to prevent transboundary harm. For
example, it is clear that duty of prevention would normally extend to a
significant risk of transboundary environmental interference causing
53
significant harm, thereby requiring precautionary risk assessment.
Obligations, of one form or another, relating to the application of clean
production methods or the setting of precautionary environmental
standards, techniques or practices are almost always associated with the
application of the precautionary principle in international instruments, 4 In
relation to the impact of the precautionary principle on other norms of
international environmental law, Bimie and Boyle note that "the ILC
special rapporteur is right to suggest that the precautionary principle is
already included in the principles of prevention and prior authorization,
and in environmental impact assessment, 'and could not be divorced
55
therefrom."'

Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J.
288, 412 (Sept. 22) (dissenting opinion of Judge Palmer); id. at 343-46 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Weeramantry).
53. See, e.g., EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVTL. L. OF THE WORLD, COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV.,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (1987), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXPERTS
GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT 75 (R.D. Munro & J.G. Lammers eds., 1986) [hereinafter EXPERTS GROUP
RECOMMENDATIONS].

54. See, e.g., Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control
of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, art.
4(3)(f), Jan. 30, 1991, 30 I.L.M 7730; Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, art. 2, app. I, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 1.L.M. 1069, available
at http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/welcome.html; Convention on the Protection of the
Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, arts. 3(2), 3(3), Annex II, Apr. 9, 1992, 13 L.L.M. 546;
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, art. 6, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
10,541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their
Transboundary Fluxes, art. 2(2)(a), Oct 31, 1988, 2001 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of
Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes, art. 3(3), Nov.
18, 1991, 2001 U.N.T.S. 187; 1991 UNGA Res. 46/215 on Large-Scale Pelagic Drift-Net
Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas;
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 5(e), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995).
55. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 41, at 120 (citing Report of the International Law
Commission,
716, May 1-June 9 & July 10-Aug. 18, 2000, U.N. Doc. GAOR A/55/10
(SUPP)).
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Another increasingly important application of the precautionary
principle is that of the ecosystems approach to natural resources
management. This application is by no means required under customary
international law, yet it is employed with increasing frequency in
watercourse conventions. Further, it would appear that a precautionary
approach is taken to the task of identifying "a grave and imminent peril"
for the purposes of establishing the existence of a state of "necessity"
under draft Article 33 of the International Law Commission's 1996 draft
56
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
The Special Rapporteur's second report suggests that a measure of
scientific uncertainty about the prospect of damage should not disqualify
57
a State from invoking necessity.
The universally accepted notion of sustainable development has
particular significance for the recent and future development of norms
and principles of international environmental law. It has been described
as "an umbrella notion encompassing a range of more specific principles
that give it effect,"5 8 including EIA, access to information and
participation in environmental decision making, the precautionary
principle, 59 inter-generational equity, intra-generational equity, and the
ecosystems approach. More importantly, it facilitates the reconciliation
of international law on protection of the environment and on the
utilisation of shared resources. This approach takes into account both
environmental and non-environmental considerations, including social,
economic, and developmental goals.
Indeed, leading commentators suggest that the reference to
States' "own environmental and developmental policies" included in
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, 60 which effectively restates the duty to
prevent transboundary environmental harm as earlier articulated in
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, does no more than "confirm
56. International Law Commission's 1996 draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9 6_2001.pdf. Similarly, in the Gab Lkovo-Nagymaros case, the ICJ strongly
suggests that environmental concerns are likely to be relevant in determining the essential
interests of States for the purposes of invoking a state of "necessity." GabtikovoNagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3,
44,49-58 (Feb. 5).
57. James Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, 289, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
498/Add.2, Apr. 30,1999.
58. Brunnbe & Toope, supranote 30, at 66.
59. For example, Trouwborst suggests that the endorsement of the goal of sustainable
development in Article 5 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention automatically implies a
recognition of the precautionary principle, as the latter is so firmly linked to the former. See
ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2003).

60.

AND

STATUS

OF THE PRECAUTIONARY

Rio Declaration, supra note 36, principle 2 (emphasis added).

PRINCIPLE

IN
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an existing and necessary reconciliation with the principle of sustainable
development and the sovereignty of states over their own natural
resources." 61 The duty of prevention has also been linked implicitly to
the notion of sustainable development by a proposal contained in the
International Law Commission's 2001 draft Convention on the
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. 62 The
draft proposes that States potentially in dispute over the prevention of
transboundary harm must negotiate an equitable balancing of interests
in accordance with a range of relevant factors, much like watercourse
States must establish an equitable regime for the utilisation of shared
freshwater resources under the principle of equitable utilisation. Indeed,
in the specific context of shared freshwater resources, the principle of
equitable and reasonable utilisation, the predominant normative concept
with
and
law,
approximates
freshwater
of
international
"operationalises" the notion of sustainable development. 63 The principle
of equitable utilisation as articulated in Article 5 of the 1997 U.N.
Convention requires watercourse States to -achieve an equitable
balancing of interests in accordance with a non-exhaustive list of factors,
including environmental and non-environmental considerations, set out
in Article 6. 64 Therefore, in relation to shared freshwater resources,
sustainable development facilitates the thorough consideration of the
various aspects of environmental protection in the determination of an
equitable regime for the utilisation of the resource. In other words, it
involves the use of the waters on the basis of a regime of equitable
utilisation, which takes full account of the environmental protection of
the shared resource. Such a regime might more appropriately be called
one of "equitable and sustainable utilisation."
As noted above, the principle of intergenerational equity,
involving a balancing of interests between present and future
generations, is at the normative core of the notion of sustainable
development. 65 In her seminal work on this principle, Edith Brown Weiss

61. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supranote 41, at 110.
62. Report on Transboundary Harm, supra note 44.
63. Id. pmbl. Patricia K. Wouters & Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke, The Role of International
Water Law in Promoting SustainableDevelopment, 12 WATER L. 281, 283 (2001). See also Marjon
Kroes, The Protection of International Watercourses as Sources of Fresh Water in the Interest of
Future Generations,in THE SCARCITY OF WATER: EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES 83
(Edward H.P. Brans et al. eds., 1997); McIntyre, supra note 42, at 88.
64. U.N. Convention, supra note 1.
65. See Rio Declaration, supra note 36, principle 3 (referring to the requirement "to
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations").
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identifies five key duties of resource use and corresponding rights66 that,
as Catherine Redgwell points out, "bear a strong resemblance to existing
general principles of international environmental law. It is not surprising
then that examples of each 'duty of use' may be found in existing treaties
in the environmental law field, as well as in emerging principles of
customary law." 67 Clearly, the precautionary principle has a role to play
in achieving a balance of interests between present and future
generations. According to Redgwell, the principle generally provides
that "where there is a threat to the global environment, yet scientific
uncertainties persist, steps can and should be taken that will benefit the
present generation in any event and mitigate suspected adverse impacts
upon future generations." 68
Similarly, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which recognises the varying culpability and capabilities of
developed and developing States, 69 stands as another core component of
sustainable development. This principle plays a role in identifying the
due diligence standards that might be expected of particular States
under the duty to prevent transboundary harm. Indeed, the general
obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing or mitigating adverse
transboundary effects has, for many years, taken account of the differing
capabilities of States. For example, Article 2 of the 1972 London
Dumping Convention 7 requires the parties to take effective measures
according to their scientific, technical and economic capabilities...."

66.

Key duties are the following:
(i) to conserve resources;
(ii) to ensure equitable use;
(iii) to avoid adverse impacts;
(iv) to prevent disasters, minimise damage and provide emergency assistance;
(v) to compensate for environmental harm.

EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 50 (1989).
67. CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERGENERATIONAL TRUSTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION 81 (1999) (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 139.
69. Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 36, provides:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have
common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit
of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place
on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources
they command.
70. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, Aug. 30, 1975, 11 I.L.M. 1291, 1295.
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Common but differentiated responsibility may also impact to modify
application of the precautionary principle, as is acknowledged in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 71
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the normative status
and substantive content of both more established and emerging rules
and principles of international environmental law, and their application
to shared international freshwater resources, is far from simple. It is
clear, however, that customary and conventional rules and principles are
closely interrelated. The consistent articulation of certain rules in
conventional regimes lends support to the argument that such rules have
achieved the status of customary international law. Established and even
emerging customary rules and principles significantly influence the
application of conventional regimes. Considering the work of the
International Law Commission and many other intergovernmental
agencies and learned associations involved in the formulation of
international environmental law and policy, it is possible to argue that
most generally applicable conventional and declaratory instruments
relating to the environment consist of little more than codifications of
existing custom or established State practice. Of course, once particular
rules or principles have been included in such codifying instruments,
their customary status is likely to be greatly enhanced. Moreover, the
rules or principles of international environmental law identified above,
whether customary or conventional in origin, are themselves closely
interrelated, having some significance for the normative status or
practical application of one or more of the others.
There are several areas of international law for which there is
strong support for a legal obligation to negotiate an equitable solution.
These include the law of high seas fisheries 72 and the law relating to
maritime boundary delimitation. 73 With regard to these areas, it is
reasonable for commentators to question whether transboundary
environmental relations are more appropriately based on equitable
balancing than on legal rules with greater certainty and predictability. 74
However, the principle of equitable utilisation has long been the
71. Rio Declaration, supra note 36, principle 15 ("In order to protect the environment,
the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation." (emphasis added)).
72. Icelandic Fisheries (U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1974 IC.J. 3 (July 25); Icelandic
Fisheries Cases (F.R.G. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25).
73. Northern Sea Shelf Continental (F.R.G. v. Den. & F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
74. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 41, at 129-30.
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uncontested cornerstone of the law of international watercourses. Thus,
it is appropriate to consider factors pertaining to environmental
protection under the framework of equitable utilisation. Of course, States
remain free to enter into whatever binding conventional environmental
arrangements they deem necessary.
The question remains, therefore, how much weight should be
given to environmental factors in the course of such a balancing of
interests and the processes by which they can be incorporated into an
equitable regime for the utilisation of shared freshwater resources? In
this regard, the author suggests that the growing corpus of broadly
supported environmental rules and principles alluded to above
emphasises the likely significance of environmental factors in this
process and provides detailed mechanisms and procedures by means of
which environmental considerations can be taken on board and
environmental damage can thus be prevented or mitigated. Arguably,
the extensive elaboration and detailed articulation of environmental
rules and principles in recent years, both of substantive elements such as
the due diligence standards required and of procedural obligations such
as the duty to notify, significantly enhances the weight accorded to
environmental considerations in the determination of an equitable
regime for the utilisation of an international watercourse.
III. PROCEDURAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Accepting the proposition that the applicable customary rules
for the use of shared freshwater resources require that significant harm
to other watercourse States should be avoided and that such use must be
equitable and reasonable, it follows that a State will need to know the
current or proposed uses of a neighbouring State. With this knowledge, a
State may ascertain whether any use will cause significant harm within
its territory or to the shared water resource or whether such use will be
equitable and reasonable. In addition to a notification procedure, other
legal machinery is required by which watercourse States may consult
and negotiate in respect of proposed works or utilisation of shared
waters. Okowa points out the proliferation, since the 1972 U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment, 75 "of treaty instruments
requiring States not so much to prevent environmental harm as to

75. See generally The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted
in Stockholm, Swed. June 15-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
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observe a number of discrete procedures before permitting the conduct
of activities which may cause such harm." 76 She further observes that,
[b]ecause these obligations are designed to reconcile the
interests of States proposing the conduct of activities and
those likely to be affected, one recurrent theme in all these
obligations is an attempt to ensure that, while some
protection is given to putative victims, the sovereignty of
the source State is also not unduly impeded in the
process. 77
Generally, procedural obligations provide a framework for the
early and amicable resolution of environmental disputes by ensuring
that interested parties are adequately informed of proposed projects and
their potential environmental implications. This provides a form of
procedural due process for the participation of interested parties,
including, where appropriate, the citizens of the State of origin and the
citizens of potentially affected States. 78 The process also provides an
opportunity for compromise to be reached, involving, for example,
alteration of the original proposal or the inclusion of remedial measures
to mitigate any likely adverse environmental effects. 79 Many
commentators would, quite correctly, count the device of transboundary
EIA among such legal procedures. 80 However, the author takes the view
that it is so intrinsically linked to the discharge and implementation of
several core substantive obligations and principles of international
environmental law, including the obligation to prevent transboundary
harm and the precautionary principle, that it is more apt to examine EIA
76.

Okowa, supra note 50, at 275. See generally FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., PRIOR

CONSULTATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY OF STATE PRACTICE (1983); SANDS, supra

note 41, ch. 16, at 596; Alan E. Boyle, The Principleof Co-operation: The Environment, in THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 120 (Vaughn Lowe & Colin

Warbrick eds., 1994).
77. Okowa, supra note 50, at 276.
78. In the context of transboundary water resources, see, e.g., United Nations:
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes, Helsinki, Fin., March 17, 1992, Text of Convention, Part II: Provisions Relating to
1-2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992)
Riparian Parties, Art. 16: Public Information,
(requiring that all "Riparian Parties" make available to the public the following
information:
(a) Water-quality objectives;
(b) Permits issued and conditions required to be met;
(c) Results of water and effluent sampling carried out for the purposes of
monitoring and assessment, as well as results of checking compliance with the water
quality objectives or the permit conditions.)
79. See Okowa, supra note 50, at 277-78.
80. Id. (including Okowa).
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alongside such substantive rules. This is not to deny the central role of
EIA in ensuring that States likely to be affected by an activity are
appropriately informed of its potential impacts and in facilitating
meaningful consultation and negotiation between proposing and
opposing States.
The existence of a general customary obligation on States to cooperate in respect to the development and utilisation of international
watercourses was suggested in the Lac Lanoux Arbitration:
States are today perfectly conscious of the importance of
the conflicting interests brought into play by the industrial
use of international rivers, and of the necessity to reconcile
them by mutual concessions. The only way to arrive at such
compromises of interests is to conclude agreements on an
increasingly comprehensive basis.... There would thus
appear to be an obligation to accept in good faith all
communications and contacts which could, by a broad
comparison of interests and by reciprocal good will,
provide States with the best conditions for concluding
agreements. 81
The International Court of Justice emphasised the necessity of cooperation among watercourse States in the recent Gab Lkovo-Nagymaros
case, stating, for example, that "only by international cooperation could
action be taken to alleviate... problems [of navigation, flood control, and
"
environmental protection]. 82
However, in the course of their discussions on the subject of
international watercourses, members of the International Law
Commission differed on whether the need for States to co-operate was a
mere aspiration or a binding legal duty. For example, Carlos Calero
Rodriguez argued that "cooperation was a goal, a guideline for conduct,
but not a strict legal obligation which, if violated, would entail
international responsibility."8 3 On the other hand, Bernhard Graefrath
insisted that "cooperation was not simply a lofty principle, but a legal
duty." 84 However, despite disagreement over the precise legal status of
the duty to co-operate per se, most agreed that it was an "umbrella term,
81.

Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 308 (1957). See also C.B.

Bourne, Procedurein the Development of InternationalDrainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and
to Negotiate, in 1972 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 219.
82. Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
83. Law of the Non-NavigationalUses ofInternationalWatercourses,1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
69, 71 (1987), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1987. See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 401 (2001).

84.

Law of the Non-Navigational Uses ofInternationalWatercourses, supra note 83, at 85.
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embracing a complex of more specific obligations which, by and large,
do reflect customary international law."85 For example, Paul Reuter
concluded that "the obligation to cooperate was a kind of label for an
entire range of obligations."8 6 Philippe Sands takes a similar view and
explains that the obligation to cooperate has "been translated into more
specific commitments," including "rules on environmental impact
assessment...; rules ensuring that neighbouring states receive necessary
information (requiring information exchange, consultation and
notification)...; the provision of emergency information...; and transboundary enforcement of environmental standards." 87 Despite the
misgivings of some of its members about the precise legal nature and
status of the obligation to co-operate, the International Law Commission
eventually decided to include an express reference to this duty in its 1994
Draft Articles.8 This reference formed the basis of Article 8 of the 1997
U.N. Watercourses Convention, 89 which recognises the practical
importance of the duty to co-operate for the attainment of the twin goals
of optimal utilisation and adequate protection of an international
watercourse. 90 Article 8 also stresses the role of joint mechanisms or
commissions in facilitating such co-operation. 91 The Convention includes
further detailed requirements that give practical effect to the rather
vague obligation to co-operate, including the obligations to notify,
consult and negotiate, exchange information, and participate in dispute
92
settlement procedures.
The general principle requiring notice and consideration of the
transboundary environmental impact of national activities is based on
the informed self-interest of nations and has long received broad
international support. For example, Principle 8 of the Draft Declaration
of the Preparatory Committee for the 1972 U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment provided that "a State having reason to believe
85. MCCAFFREY, supra note 83, at 401.
86. Law of the Non-NavigationalUses of InternationalWatercourses, supranote 83, at 75.
87. SANDS, supra note 41, at 197-98.
88. Report of the International Law Commission, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2, 88, 105
(1994).
89. U.N. Convention, supranote 1.
90. Id. art. 8(1) (providing that "[wiatercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain
optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse").
91. Id. art. 8(2) (providing that, [iun determining the manner of such cooperation,
watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or conmissions, as
deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures
in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and
commissions in various regions).
92. Id. at 707-10, 713-14 (arts. 9,11-19, 33).
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that the activities of another State may cause damage to its environment
or to the environment of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
may request international consultations concerning the envisaged
activities." 93 Principle 20 of the Draft Declaration further required that
"[r]elevant information must be supplied by States on activities or
developments within their jurisdiction or under their control whenever
they believe, or have reason to believe, that such information is needed
to avoid the risk of significant adverse effects on the environment in
areas beyond their national jurisdiction." 94
Though Principle 20 was not adopted at Stockholm, due
principally to Brazilian opposition, 95 the concept received broad support.
In fact, the U.N. General Assembly subsequently adopted, by a vote of
115 to 0 with 10 abstentions, a resolution specifically addressing the issue
of notice of activities having potential for transboundary environmental
harm in which the General Assembly resolved that it
[riecognizes that cooperation between States in the field of
the environment ... will be effectively achieved if official
and public knowledge is provided of the technical data
relating to the work to be carried out by States within their
national jurisdiction with a view to avoiding significant
harm that may occur in the human environment of the
adjacent area
and that "[tihe technical data referred to... will be given and received in
the best spirit of cooperation and good neighbourliness...."96
In relation to international water resources in particular, U.S.
practice in this area provides an early and highly developed example of
notice and consultation provisions applying in relation to water
pollution having international dimensions. The Federal Water Pollution
Act of 1956 required that where there was

93. See 1972 Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm,
Swed., Draft Declaration of the PreparatoryCommittee, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/PC.6; U.N. Doc
A/ CONF.48/PC.9 and Corr.1, U.N. A/CONF.48/PC.13 and Corr.1, and U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/PC.17 (reports of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee) (the Declaration
is also included in the UNEP account of the Constitution of the Conference, availableat http:
=
//www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingualdefault.asp?DocumentlD--97&ArticlelD 1496&l=en).
94. Id.
95. Apparently, Brazilian opposition was due to the fact that Brazil was planning to
build three high dams on the Parana River, which is an important source of water for
downstream Argentina. See Albert E. Utton, International Environmental Law and
ConsultationMechanisms, 12 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 56, 71-72 n.76 (1973).
96. UNGA Resolution 2995, Dec. 15, 1972, reprinted in 68 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 56-57
(1973).
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reason to believe that any pollution (of interstate or
navigable waters) which endangers the health or welfare of
persons in a foreign country is occurring... [t]he Secretary
[of the Interior], through the Secretary of State, shall invite
the foreign country which may be adversely affected by the
pollution to attend and participate in the conference, and
the representative of such country shall, for the purposes of
the conference, have all the rights of a State water pollution
control agency. 97
Okowa points out that, prior to the 1972 Stockholm process, the
inclusion of such procedural obligations was especially common in early
treaties concerned with regulating the conduct of States in relation to
international watercourses. 98 Describing the significance of procedural
rules relating to international water law in 1977, Oscar Schachter
succinctly explained the reason for this significance and the nature of the
relationship between procedural obligations and the malleable cardinal
water law principle of equitable utilisation:
It is reasonable.. .that procedural requirements should be
regarded as essential to the equitable sharing of water
resources. They have particular importance because of the
breadth and flexibility of the formulae for equitable use and
appropriation. In the absence of hard and precise rules for
allocation, there is a relatively greater need for specifying
requirements for advance notice, consultation, and decision
procedures. Such requirements are, in fact, commonly
found in agreements by neighbouring States concerning
99
common lakes and rivers.
97. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(2) (1970), reprinted in Utton, supra note 95, at 65-66.
98. Okowa, supra note 50, at 275, 275 n.2 (citing the following early treaties: "General
Convention of 14 December 1931 between Romania and Yugoslavia concerning the
Hydraulic System, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 135, p.31; Agreement of 10 April 1922
for the Settlement of Questions Relating to Watercourses and Dykes on the German-Danish
Frontier, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol.10, p.201; Treaty of 24 February 1950 between
Hungary and the USSR concerning the Regime of Soviet-Hungarian State Frontier, United
Nations, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisionsconcerning the Utilizationof InternationalRivers
for other Purposes than Navigation (hereinafter Legislative Texts), p. 823, No. 266.. .Treaty of 11
January 1909 between Great Britain and the United States of America relating to Boundary
Waters and Questions concerning the Boundary between Canada and the United States,
Legislative Texts, p. 260, No. 79; Convention of 11 May 1929 between Norway and Sweden
on Certain Questions relating to the Law on Watercourses, League of Nations Treaty Series,
vol.120, p. 263").
99. MCCAFFREY, supra note 83, at 398 (quoting 'OSCAR SCHACHTER, SHARING THE
WORLD'S REsouRcEs 69 (1977)).
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More recently, the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes imposes upon parties a range of
procedural obligations relating to, inter alia, the exchange of information
on existing and planned uses of shared waters, participation in
consultations, and the provision of warnings. 1°° Similarly, the 1997 U.N.
Watercourses Convention contains detailed procedural provisions. 101
Likewise, in 1973, Utton concluded that "a general principle of
limited territorial sovereignty or neighborliness already requires nations
to consider the environmental impact of their activities on other
nations," but "the institutional machinery to implement such
consideration is wholly inadequate. The elaboration of procedures and
the development of appropriate fora for the consideration of activities
that have the potential for environmental harm is yet to be
102
accomplished."
03
Most leading contemporary commentators shared this view
In the context of shared freshwater resources, however, Charles Bourne
argued that the requirement of reasonableness inherent in the Helsinki
Rules requires prior notice of uses of international watercourses that
might have significant environmental impacts on other watercourse
States and involvement of such States at the planning stage rather than
after the damage has occurred. 1°4 Furthermore, he usefully elaborated
detailed procedural rules for involving potentially affected watercourse
States:
First, a state must give co-basin states prior notice of works
or utilizations that might cause them serious injury.
...
Second, a state wishing to undertake a work or
utilization that might cause serious injury to co-basin states
must give them sufficient information about it so that they

100. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, supra note 78. By the end of 2000, the Convention had 26 Signatories
and 33 Parties, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterXXVII/treaty27.asp. See generally ANDRI NOLLKAEMPER,
THE LEGAL REGIME FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER POLLUION: BETWEEN DISCRETION AND

CONSTRAINT (1993).
101. U.N. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9, 11-18.
102. Utton, supranote 95, at 59.
103. See generally L.F.E. GOLDIE, Development of an International Environmental Law -An
Appraisal, in LAW, INsTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 104, 129 (John Lawrence
Hargrove ed., 1972); A.P. Lester, River Pollution in InternationalLaw, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 828,
833 (1963).
104. C.B. Bourne, International Law and Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 6 U.
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 115, 121 (1971).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

may appreciate the true nature of the proposed work or
utilization. Third, a state is under an obligation to consult
and to negotiate in good faith with co-basin states that
object to a proposed work or utilization of waters on the
ground that it will adversely affect them. Fourth, a state is
under an obligation to suspend the undertaking of a work
or utilization of waters until notice and information about it
has been given to co-basin states and a reply received or, in
the absence of a reply, a reasonable time has passed, and, if
objection is raised by a co-basin state, until negotiations
have taken place for a reasonable time without success or
until reasonable attempts to negotiate have been made
without result. °5
Professor Bourne's recommendations now appear prophetic considering
the procedural rules eventually adopted under the 1997 Convention and
recent developments in customary international law.
Conclusions Regarding Procedural Rules
It is worth noting that the International Law Commission's 2001
draft Convention on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from
Hazardous Activities, 10 6 in addition to confirming the general obligation
to prevent transboundary harm, codifies existing related international
obligations relating to environmental impact assessment, notification,
consultation, 107 monitoring, and diligent control of activities likely to
cause such harm. These related procedural obligations operate to
discharge the more general duty of States to co-operate in the reasonable
and equitable utilisation of international watercourses. Commentators
agree that the duty to provide neighbouring States with prior notice of
plans to exploit a shared natural resource is an obligatory requirement
under customary international lawl° or "a generally recognised

105. Id. at 122.
106. See generallyReport on Transboundary Harm, supra note 44.
107. In the light of arbitral and judicial guidance, Nollkaemper has defined the duty to
consult to mean that the State in question "has to engage in an exchange of views with
potentially affected states so as to make the consideration of their interests a component in
its final determination." NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 100, at 165.
108. See generally J. de Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 1
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 198 (1978); KIRGIs, supranote

76, at 86, 128; U.N. Econ. Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Affairs, Management of InternationalWater
Resources: Institutionaland Legal Aspects, 50-51, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/5 (1975).
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principle of international environmental law." 109 Several States have
sought to rely on the duty to provide prior notification in the course of
international disputes1 0 The obligation certainly receives broad support
in important recent conventional"' and declaratory instruments." 2 In
addition, Okowa asserts that, even where it is not expressly provided for,
the obligation to notify "must be taken as implicit in any requirement to
conduct environmental impact assessment," as such assessments are
113
required with a view to protecting the interests of third States.
There is potential for uncertainty as to which States are likely to
be affected by a particular activity and consequently entitled to
notification, or as to which types of activities and forms of injuries the
State of origin must notify to the potentially affected States. However,
both the precautionary principle and the more inclusive ecosystems
approach might function to address these questions. Article 12 of the
1997 U.N. Convention acknowledges the link between effective
notification and transboundary EIA by expressly requiring that the
results of any EIA accompany the notification. The duty to notify may be
facilitated by institutional machinery and the widely adopted 1992 ECE
Convention requires Parties to enter into bilateral or multilateral
agreements or other arrangements that provide for the establishment of
joint bodies to have responsibility for, inter alia, "the exchange of
information on existing and planned uses of water and related
installations that are likely to cause transboundary impact" 114 and to
"participate in the implementation of environmental impact assessments
relating to transboundary waters, in accordance with appropriate

109. See Johan G. Lammers, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the EnglishSpeaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (Hague Academy of International Law: Center for Studies and
Research in International Law and International Relations ed., 1985).
110. See generally Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 308 (1957);
MCCAFFREY, supra note 83, at 265-67 (Itaipfi Dam), 233-47 (Aswan Dam).
111. See generally 1992 Espoo Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents, supra note 46, arts. 3, 10.
112. See 1972 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 43, recommendation 51(b)(i) ("[Wihen
major water resource activities are contemplated that may have a significant environmental
effect on another country, the other country should be notified well in advance of the
activity envisaged.").
113. Okowa, supra note 50, at 289. However, the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (1991) expressly includes the obligation to notify
under Article 3; Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, Espoo, Fin., Feb. 25, 1991, Notification, 30 I.L.M. 802, 804, available at
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/ documents/conventiontextenglish.pdf.
114. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, supra note 78, art. 9(2)(h).
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international regulations."" 5 In a rare example of a treaty instrument
expressly taking a broader, more ecosystems oriented approach to
international co-operation, Article 9 also provides for the involvement of
non-riparian States "directly and significantly affected by transboundary
impact.. .in the activities of multilateral joint bodies established by
Parties riparian to such transboundary waters." 116 The joint bodies that
Parties are required to establish shall have among their tasks "to
participate in the implementation of environmental impact assessments
relating to transboundary waters, in accordance with appropriate
international regulations." 117 Article 13 of the 1997 U.N. Convention
provides that, unless otherwise agreed, the notifying State shall allow
notified States a period of six months within which to study and evaluate
the measures and to communicate their findings." 8 However, this period
must be extended for a further six months at the request of a notified
State "for which the evaluation of the planned measures poses special
difficulty." 119 This provision may be a reference to the emerging
international environmental law principle of "common but differentiated
responsibility."
Other related obligations under the duty to co-operate include
the duty to negotiate in good faith,120 the duty to warn, and duties
relating to more general and regular exchange of information. According
to Okowa, "Almost all the treaty instruments on environmental
protection provide for the exchange of information on a regular basis." 121
McCaffrey perceives this obligation as "a necessary adjunct to, or
perhaps even an integral part of, the obligations of equitable utilization
and prevention of significant harm." 122 Similarly, the Experts Group on
Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and

115. Id. art. 9(2)0).
116. Id. art. 9(3).
117. Id. art. 9(2)0).
118. U.N. Convention, supra note 1, at 708.
119. Id.
120. Negotiations would not be so conducted where one party terminates the
negotiations without justification, imposes abnormal delays or time limits, fails to adhere to
the agreed procedure, or systematically refuses to consider the proposals or the interests of
the other party. See Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 307 (1957).
121. Okowa, supra note 50, at 300 (citation omitted).
122. MCCAFFREY, supra note 83, at 411. He goes on to explain that,
without data and information from co-riparian states concerning the
condition of the watercourse, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for
a state not only to regulate uses and provide protection (e.g., against floods
and pollution) within its territory, but also to ensure that its utilization is
equitable and reasonable vis-A-vis other states sharing the watercourse.
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Development linked the obligation closely to the principle of equitable
utilisation, stating that "the duty to provide information may in principle
pertain to many factors.. .which may have to be taken into account in
order to arrive at a reasonable and equitable use of a transboundary
natural resource." 123 Though determination of breach of such an
obligation is bound to be problematic in the absence of uniform
principles or rules regulating the collection or dissemination of
information, Okowa speculates that, "should damage occur, failure to
supply such information may be taken as evidence that the State on
whom the duty is incumbent has not exercised due diligence over
activities under its jurisdiction and control." 124 This duty is most
effectively discharged through the establishment of permanent river
basin institutions to facilitate common management of the shared water
resources. Indeed, Dupuy concludes that the regular exchange of
information by means of such permanent regional institutions "seems to
be the most appropriate way of establishing a reasonable and equitable
125
use of shared natural resources, as is required by internationallaw."
Procedural obligations appear to play a particularly significant
role in relation to regimes for the protection of water or other shared
natural resources. It is therefore widely accepted that, despite the lack of
a similar customary requirement in relation to environmental obligations
generally, customary law in the context of shared water resources
imposes a binding obligation to notify other States, supply information,
and enter into consultations. 126 Early support for the existence of these
customary obligations can be found in a long line of European 27 and
other 128 treaties and State practices' 29 on the utilisation of international
123. EXPERTS GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 53, at 95 (Art. 10: Prevention and
Abatement of a Transboundary Environmental Interference).
124. Okowa, supra note 50, at 301.
125. Dupuy, supra note 3, at 73 (emphasis added).
126.

See J. BRUHAcs, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL

USES OF INTERNATIONAL

WATERCOURSES 176-77 (M. Zehery trans., 1993).
127. See Convention on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern,
Apr. 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 35; Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the
Danube, Aug. 18, 1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 197; Agreement on the International Commission for
the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, Apr. 23, 1963, 994 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement
Concerning the Use of Water Resources in Frontier Waters, Pol.-U.S.S.R., July 17, 1964, 552
U.N.T.S.175; Agreement concerning Co-operation in Water Economy Questions in Frontier
Rivers, art. 9, F.R.G-Czech Rep., 1974; Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against
Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 242 (1977). For an extensive survey, see KIRGIS,
supra note 76, ch. 2.
128. See Okowa, supra note 50, at 275 & n.2 (citing Boundary Waters Treaty, art. IX);
Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, U.A.R.-Sudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 453
U.N.T.S. 51; Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pak., art. IV, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125;
Agreement Concerning the Niger River Commission and the Navigation and Transport on
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watercourses. Okowa points out that these duties are generally complied
with even in the absence of applicable treaty provisions. 130 Similarly, in a
comprehensive study of practice surrounding the duty to warn in
customary international law, John Woodliffe concludes that it is more
developed in situations that involve the utilisation of a shared natural
131
resource (SNR), such as an international watercourse system.
The procedural rules set down in the 1997 U.N. Convention
codify and formalise many existing rules of customary international law.
In so doing, the Convention further strengthens and legitimises such
rules. In summarising the procedural rules as set down in Part II of the
Draft Articles, Bourne concluded that,
[f]or the most part, the basic requirements of the exchange
of information, notice, consultation, and negotiation now
form part of customary international law. In fleshing out
these basic rules, such as providing for a six-month time
limit, the ILC has engaged in beneficial progressive
development of the law ....
the new provisions merely
elaborate the existing law and will make it more effective.
Insofar as these provisions constitute new law, they should
have little difficulty in gaining ready acceptance by the
13 2
international community.
In relation to the law of international watercourses, however, the
very central role of procedural rules in facilitating effective application of
the principle of equitable utilisation, and of the subsidiary rule on the
prohibition of significant transboundary harm, as well as their
the River Niger, Nov. 25,1964,587 U.N.T.S. 19; 1971 Act of Santiago concerning Hydrologic
Basins, reprinted in II Y.B. OF INT'L L. COMM'N. 324 (1974); Agreement on the Permanent and
Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, U.S.Mex., Aug. 30, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1105; Agreement Between the United States of America and
Canada on the Great Lakes Water Quality, U.S.-Can., art. IX, Nov. 22, 1978,30 U.S.T. 1383.
129. For a comprehensive survey of State practice in this area, see J.G. LAMMERS,
POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES:
PRINCIPLES OF LAW, 165 (1984).

SEARCH FOR SUBSTANTIVE RULES AND

130. Okowa, supra note 50, at 319.
131. J. Woodliffe, Tackling Transboundary Environmental Hazards in Cases of Emergency:
The Emerging Legal Framework, in CURRENT ISSUES IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
105, 14445 (Robin White & Bernard Smythe eds., 1990). Woodliffe explains that, "[blecause
utilization of an SNR heightens the risk of transfrontier environmental harm, there is a
broad measure of juristic support for the existence of a duty to warn states of any
emergency situation which might cause sudden harmful effects to their environment." Id.
at 115.
132. Charles B. Bourne, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of
InternationalWatercourses:Principles and Planned Measures, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.& POL'Y
65, 72 (1992) (citation omitted).
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elaboration through the 1997 Convention, lends such procedural rules
added significance. As Special Rapporteur McCaffrey concluded in his
Third Report, "Thus the doctrine of equitable utilization does not exist in
isolation. It is part of a normative structure that includes procedural
requirements necessary to its implementation: the substantive and
procedural principles form an integrated whole." 133
IV. CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
There remains considerable debate surrounding the role and
influence of environmental factors in general, and the environmental
impact of the use of an international watercourse on other watercourse
States in particular, in the determination of an equitable regime for the
utilisation of international watercourses. Some leading authorities have
concluded that causing significant harm to the environment is a special
category of injury that makes the harmful utilisation an inequitable use
of the watercourse per se.134 The International Law Association clearly
articulated the opposing view, stating that "uses of the waters by a basin
State that cause pollution in a co-basin State must be considered from the
overall perspective of what constitutes an equitable utilization." 135 This
pronouncement dates from before the advent of modern international
environmental law and policy normally associated with the 1972
Stockholm process.
The International Law Commission has been rather more
circumspect regarding the significance of the obligation to prevent
transboundary harm for the operation of the principle of equitable
utilisation.136 Its 1991 Draft Articles accorded priority to the duty to
prevent harm so that pollution, or any other class of interference, that
caused significant harm would be inequitable per se.137 In 1993, the
Special Rapporteur, Robert Rosenstock, considered that the Draft
Articles should be updated to reflect developments in the area of
international environmental law and practice. He proposed a redraft of
Article 7 that would have made equitable and reasonable utilisation the
decisive criterion in determining the permissible uses of an international
133. McCAFFREY, supra note 83, at 411 (citing Stephen C. McCaffrey, Third Report, 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 15, pt. 1 (1987)).
134. See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 100, at 68-69.
135. Int'l L. Ass'n, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference 499 (Helsinki, Aug. 1966),
reprinted in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra note 1, at 779,795.
136. See generally Ximena Fuentes, The Criteriafor the Equitable Utilizationof International
Rivers, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 337,409-11 (1996).
137. See id. at 409-10.
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watercourse. His proposal also would have given special treatment to
pollution so that it created a rebuttable presumption of inequity. 138 The
final version of Article 7 adopted by the Commission in 1994 makes no
mention of pollution and simply subordinates the obligation to prevent
significant harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable
utilisation.139 Therefore, at least in relation to Articles 5 and 7, it would
appear that pollution is not to be given special treatment nor viewed as a
particularly significant class of harm. However, the ILC's 1994 Draft
Articles, and now the 1997 U.N. Convention, proceeded to include a
general obligation to "protect and preserve the ecosystems of
international watercourses" 140 and an obligation to prevent, "reduce and
control pollution of an international watercourse that may cause
significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment." 141
Similarly, the Convention requires watercourse States to take all
measures necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment. 142
Neither the Convention nor the commentary to the earlier Draft Articles
elaborates on the relationship between these obligations and the
principle of equitable utilisation. In particular, the draft lacks clarity as to
whether the scope of the latter principle is limited by the operation of
these environmental obligations. Somewhat unhelpfully, the commentary to Article 21(2) merely states that "[t]his paragraph is a specific
application of the general principles contained in articles 5 and 7."143

138. See Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 23 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 241
(UN/ILC), 242 (1993). The proposed Article 7 provided that
[wlatercourse States shall exercise due diligence to utilize an international
watercourse in such a way as not to cause significant harm to other
watercourse States, absent their agreement, except as may be allowable
under an equitable and reasonable use of the watercourse. A use which
causes significant harm in the form of pollution shall be presumed to be an
inequitable and unreasonable use unless there is:
(a) a clear showing of special circumstances indicating a compelling
need for ad hoc adjustment; and
(b) the absence of any imminent threat to human health and safety.
Robert Rosenstock, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/451 (Apr. 20, 1993).
139. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session,
Supplement No. 10 A/49/10 (May 2-July 22, 1994), at 236. The commentary to Article 7
explains that "[i]n certain circumstances 'equitable and reasonable utilization' of an
international watercourse may still involve significant harm to another watercourse State.
Generally, in such instances, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization remains
the guiding criterion in balancing the interests at stake." Id. arts. 5, 7.
140. Id. art. 20.
141. Id. art. 21(2).
142. Id. art. 23.
143. Id. at 291.
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At any rate, it is possible to argue that environmental factors are
likely to enjoy a certain priority, or at least an increasing significance,
within the balancing process that comprises practical implementation of
the principle of equitable utilisation. Though any conclusions as to the
relative significance of factors relating to environmental protection could
only ever amount to a "rule of thumb" or broad guidelines to assist the
diplomatic negotiator, legal advisor, or judicial decision-maker, they are
useful and necessary nonetheless. One writer, discussing the case of the
Jordan River, notes that "consideration of all these factors without a
method of gauging their relative importance cannot provide conclusive
and realistic solutions to disputes over international waters." 144 Articles
6(3)145 and 10(1)146 of the 1997 Convention respectively provide that no
particular factor or use enjoys inherent priority. Yet, it would certainly
appear that, along with the consideration of vital human needs that are
accorded a special position under Article 10(2),147 factors relating to
environmental protection, as articulated or alluded to in Articles 5, 6, 7,
20, 21, 22, and 23, enjoy enhanced significance by virtue of their express
and detailed inclusion. Article 21(3), for example, specifically lists
indicative measures and methods to prevent, reduce, and control
pollution of an international watercourse on which watercourse States
shall consult with a view to reaching agreement. 148 Such detailed
conventional guidance for the practical implementation of the obligation
to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of an international watercourse

144. Jonathan M. Wenig, Water and Peace: The Past, the Present, and the Futureof the Jordan
River Watercourse:An InternationalLaw Analysis, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331, 348 (1995).
145. Article 6(3) provides,
The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance
in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a
reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered
together a a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
U.N. Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(3).
146. Article 10(1) provides that, "[iun the absence of agreement or custom to the
contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses."
Id. art. 10(1).
147. Article 10(2) provides that, "[i]nthe event of a conflict between uses of an
international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special
regard being given to the requirements of vital human needs." Id. art 10(2).
148. These include:
(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria;
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point
and non-point sources;
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the
waters of an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited,
investigated or monitored.
Id. art. 21(3).
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that may cause significant harm to other watercourse States is of
considerable assistance in determining whether environmental factors
have been adequately considered, or in ensuring that environmental
obligations are duly discharged, as a component of an equitable regime
for the utilisation of shared waters. Obviously, the implementation of
detailed environmental provisions will be greatly assisted where
international joint bodies have been established with the requisite
technical and other resources to facilitate appropriate fact-finding and
consultation. Some commentators have interpreted Articles 7, 20, and 21
of the Draft Articles as establishing the requirement of due diligence as
the determinative criterion so that harm due to a failure to satisfy this
149
requirement is inequitable per se.
Procedural obligations, and the requirement to conduct an EIA
in particular, play a key role in ensuring that environmental
considerations relating to a planned or continuing use of a watercourse
are adequately understood and presented and thus that they may
properly be taken into account. Also, the principle of sustainable
development, if it is to be equated with the principle of equitable
utilisation in the particular context of international watercourses, would
lend support to the proposition that considerations of environmental
protection enjoy considerable significance under the latter principle, as
environmental protection has always constituted a major component of
the former.
The widespread use of international joint commissions to
facilitate the common management of international watercourses ensures
that factors relating to environmental protection are identified,
articulated and given due consideration in determining regimes for the
equitable utilisation of those watercourses. Such international bodies are
charged with a variety of functions, ranging from fact-finding roles to
the settlement of disputes. As these bodies' environmental
responsibilities are normally expressly included in their founding
instruments, they would usually enjoy a clear mandate to act in the
interest of environmental protection as well as the technical, legal,
political, and administrative expertise to do so effectively. Finally, it is a
moot point whether several of the proposed rules and principles of
international environmental law have achieved the status of "custom"
for the purposes of Article 10(1) and, accordingly, for determining
149. Brune & Toope, supra note 30, at 63-64, conclude that "the Draft Articles adopted
in 1994.. .ultimately make due diligence the decisive criterion. Thus, significant harm
resulting from a failure to exercise due diligence violates both the transboundary harm and
equitable use principles." However, Fuentes strongly disagrees with this interpretation. See
Fuentes, supra note 136, at 411.
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whether considerations of environmental protection may enjoy priority
over other relevant factors. Indeed, regardless of whether or not they
have formally achieved customary status, the sophisticated and detailed
articulation of the rules and principles of international environmental
law provides a comprehensive set of reference standards and procedures
to assist the consideration of environmental impacts and benefits.
Perhaps the degree of normative specificity of rules and principles of
environmental protection, substantive and procedural, plays the most
significant role in ensuring that environmental values are accorded
considerable, and even disproportionate, weight in any equitable
balancing of interests.
A. Sustainable Development
The notion of sustainable development has its origins in
conventional and declaratory instruments of international environmental
law and has always sought to reconcile protection of the natural
environment with the requirements of economic and social development.
It follows that environmental considerations would figure strongly in
any application of the principle. For instance, in a critique of a recent
U.K. Government White Paper setting out its strategy for sustainable
development, commentators condemned its under-emphasis of the
essential environmental dimension of the concept.15 0 The 1987 Bruntland
Report, which brought the concept to centre stage, elaborates on its
substantive content, stating that "it contains within it two key concepts:
the concept of 'needs'...and the idea of limitations imposed by the state
of technology and social organizations on the environment's ability to
meet present and future needs." 151 In an examination of the relative
priority accorded to environmental and developmental values
respectively under the concept of sustainable development, Ximena
Fuentes concluded that "[t]he balance seems to tip in favour of the
protection of the environment," and that "environmental protection has
developed to a certain extent at the expense of international economic
law relating to development." 15 2 She explains that this phenomenon can
be attributed to a number of reasons. First, she suggests that there is a
150. See A. Ross-Robertson, Is the Environment Getting Squeezed Out of Sustainable
Development?, 2003 PuB. L. 249. See also Dieter Helm, Objectives, Instruments and Institutions,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: OBJECTIVES, INSTRUMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (Dieter

Helm ed., 2000).
151. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987).
152. Ximena Fuentes, InternationalLaw-Making in the Field of SustainableDevelopment: The
Unequal Competition Between Development and the Environment, 2 INT'L ENvTL. AGREEMENTS:
POL., L. & ECON. 109, 109 (2002).
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"democratic deficit" in international environmental law making, due to
the opening of "the international environmental law-making process to
greater participation by the so-called 'transnational civil society'," 15 3 for
whom "environmental concerns have figured more prominently in their
international agenda." 15 4 She observes that "NGOs [non-governmental
organisations] concerned with poverty alleviation and those
propounding more equitable economic relations between States seem not
to have acquired the same degree of influence as environmental NGOs,
industries, and businesses." 155 Secondly, she argues that "[e]nvironmental law, in contrast to international development law, has proved
particularly suitable for the use of a 'rights and duties' language," which
provides environmental law, and the values that are inherent therein,
with "autonomy" or something of an absolute character so that "policy
considerations are generally excluded from the interpretation and
application of the law." 156 She explains that "[t]his perspective puts

environmental considerations in a privileged position as it would not be
necessary to assess their relevance alongside other concerns."15 7 In
relation to shared water resources in particular, Fuentes points to the
apparent contradiction between the principle of equitable
utilization, which in principle requires consideration of the
environmental impact of the utilization of an international
watercourse along with other criteria, and Articles 7, 20 and
21 [of the 1997 Convention] which might be interpreted as
having the effect of putting environmental impact outside
the scope of application of the principle of equitable
utilization. 5 8

Fuentes goes on to explain that this interpretation "results, in
practice, in a restriction upon the operation of the principle of equitable
utilization. According to this interpretation, environmental impact will
15 9
not be subject to distributive (or developmental) considerations."
Thirdly, Fuentes points to the emergence of a nascent human right to a
153. Id. at 113.
154. Id. at 115.
155. Id. at 117-18.
156. Id. at 118.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 124.
159. Id. Indeed, Fuentes points to support for this interpretation, stating that, "in other
areas of international law, such as the allocation of trans-boundary natural resources, the
idea that environmental impact should be one more criterion to be taken into account in the
establishment of equitable regimes for the utilization of shared natural resources has run
into considerable opposition." Id. at 125.
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"decent" or "healthy" environment and suggests that, "through the
establishment of a human right to a healthy environment, environmental
considerations may be given priority over mere economic and social
interests." 16° She notes that "the very idea of environmental rights can
defeat the central nucleus of sustainable development [and thus of
equitable utilisation]: the achievement of integration between development and the environment." 161 She further argues that, even if the right
to a healthy environment cannot be regarded as a "human right" in any
orthodox sense, it may be considered to be a political and civil right or an
economic and social right 162 and concludes that "either of these two
forms strengthen the potential of a right to a healthy environment to take
precedence over non-rights based interests."163
In relation to the use of shared freshwater resources, it has been
suggested that the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation
"operationalises" the notion of sustainable development. 164 Jutta Brun~e
and Stephen Toope comment that
a link between equitable use and sustainability would
promote common environmental interests of states in
several respects. First, the linkage emphasizes the need to
consider the environmental context when balancing
competing use interests. Below the threshold of
transboundary harm, and even where there may be no
current interference with the equitable share of another
state, a sustainability criterion would articulate long-term
environmental limits to water use. Second, the notion of
sustainable development ties a state's resource use into a
broader international context. Because the concept applies
both in the "micro" and "macro" context of environmental
management, a state's performance will be measured

160. Id. at 126.
161. Id.
162. See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), at 49, U.N. GAOR, XXI Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966). See also U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Human Rights
Resolution 2000/8, Promotion of the Realization of the Right to Drinking Water and Sanitation,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/L.20 (Aug. 17, 2000) (affirming that the right to water is an
individual and collective human right and is closely linked to other rights); Henri Smets,
The Right to Water Is a Human Right, 34 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 241(2004); S.R. Tully, The
Contribution of Human Rights to Freshwater Resource Management, 14 Y.B INT'L. ENVrL. L. 101
(2003).
163. Fuentes, supra note 152, at 128.
164. See, e.g., Wouters & Rieu-Clarke, supra note 63, at 283; Kroes, supra note 63, at 83;
McIntyre, supra note 42, at 88.
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against local, regional, and even global sustainability
criteria. The concept thus acknowledges the commonality
of environmental concerns and the indivisibility of
ecosystems. 165
Therefore, universal recognition of the application of the
overarching objective of sustainable development may be regarded as
making applicable to this area of law the plethora of international rules
and standards relating to environmental protection in general and to the
protection of water quality and watercourse ecosystems in particular. In
the course of an analysis of the principles of equity, no-harm, and
sustainability as included in the 1997 Convention, the authoritative
commentator Charles Bourne concluded that sustainability is a goal or
objective that could be attained by reliance on equity.166 Similarly, Lowe
concludes, in relation to the flexibility inherent in the application of
equitable principles, that
[tihese characteristics make equity particularly suitable for
discussions in contexts where there are competing interests
which have not hardened into specific rights and duties.
This will be true primarily in areas where the law is not
highly developed. The nascent concept of intergenerational
equity, and of equitable principles in environmental law,
167
are examples.
Despite criticism to the effect that the principle of equitable
utilisation as articulated in the 1997 U.N. Convention does not go far
enough in terms of achieving sustainability, 168 Botchway concludes that
"the Watercourses Convention does represent an advance on the

165. Brunn6e & Toope, supra note 30, at 67-68 (citation omitted).
166. Charles B. Bourne, The Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the 1997
WatercoursesConvention, 35 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 215, 221-30 (1997).
167. Vaughan Lowe, The Role of Equity in InternationalLaw, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L. L. 54, 73
(1992), reprinted in M. KOSKENNIEMI, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (2000).
168. See generally A. Nollkaemper, The Contributionof the InternationalLaw Commission to
InternationalWater Law: Does It Reverse the Flightfrom Substance?, XXVII NETH. Y.B. INT'L L.
39 (1996); Gtinther Handl, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of
International Watercourses (General Principles and Planned Measures): Progressive or
Retrogressive Development of InternationalLaw? 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y. 123 (1992);
Ellen Hey, Sustainable Use of Shared Water Resources: The Need for a ParadigmaticShift in
International Watercourse Law, in THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY
RESOURCES 127 (Gerald H. Blake et al. eds., 1995); Reaz Rahman, The Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses: Dilemma for Lower Riparians, 19 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 9 (1995-1996); Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared
Freshwater:The Challengesof InternationalWater Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 384 (1996).
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previous judicial texts, especially the Helsinki Rules." 169 He opines that
the doctrine of equitable utilisation adopted under the Convention, if
considered in conjunction with the obligations to notify and co-operate,
includes many of the features of sustainable development, noting that
"inmany ways, the Watercourses Convention incorporates the concepts
of polluter pays, integration of environmental concerns into economic
planning, the precautionary principle, and EIA."170 Further, he goes so
far as to suggest renaming the concept borne of the marriage of
sustainable development and equitable utilisation, stating, "all this can
be recast in a modified version of sustainable development and equitable
development, a hybrid concept -sustainable equity."171
Sustainable development has received notable support in
judicial decision making. In the Gab[kovo-Nagymaros case, 172 it is clear
that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was concerned to ensure that,
in the development of the Danube, environmental factors were to be
given full consideration and accorded considerable significance in the
determination of an equitable regime for the utilisation of the river. The
Court referred to "this need to reconcile economic development with
protection of the environment.. .aptly expressed in the concept of
sustainable development." 173 In a separate opinion, Judge Weeramantry
considered sustainable development to be "more than a mere concept,
but as a principle with normative value which is crucial to the
determination of this case." 174 Therefore, the ICJ is prepared to have
regard for the principle of sustainable development in order to identify
and give effect to the environmental obligations inherent in the principle
of equitable and reasonable utilisation of an international watercourse
"with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof," as
required under Article 5 of the 1997 U.N. Convention.
Of the various substantive and procedural elements that
together constitute the concept of sustainable development, 7 5 the
requirement that States conduct an EIA of projects or activities likely to
cause significant harm to other States enjoys the clearest support in State
169. Francis N. Botchway, The Context of Trans-Boundary Energy Resource Exploitation:
The Environment, the State and the Methods, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191, 222-23
(2003).
170. Id. at 223.
171. Id. at 222.
172. Case Concerning the Gab~lkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
173. Id. at 77-78, 140.
174. Id. at 88 (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
175. See Phillippe Sands, InternationalLaw in the Field of Sustainable Development, 65 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 303, 379 (1994) (on the elements of sustainable development). See also
Botchway, supra note 169, at 204-14.
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and judicial practice. This requirement possesses the clearest
independent normative status, and can, in practical terms, exert the
greatest influence on the attainment of sustainability and the discharge
of the environmental obligations inherent in equitable utilisation.
B. Environmental Impact Assessment
The requirement to carry out an environmental impact
assessment of any development or activity with the potential to cause
harm to the environment of an international watercourse or of another
watercourse State ensures that environmental concerns figure
prominently in determining an equitable regime for the utilisation of an
international watercourse. As the practice of assessment evolves
through, inter alia, the collection and study of environmental impact
statements in central repositories; 176 the adoption of a general convention
on transboundary EIA, which is widely taken to set universal minimum
standards for transboundary EIA procedures; 177 and the elaboration of
sector-specific guidelines by multilateral development banks' 78 or non-

176. For example, many academic institutions collect and collate completed
Environmental Impact Statements for the purposes of teaching and research.
177. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802. See also Okowa, supra note 50, at 282 ("A broad range of
standards and largely non-controversial principles may nevertheless be detected in existing
treaty instruments. The 1991 ECE Convention on environmental impact assessment, for
instance, specifies in some detail the minimum components of a good environmental
impact assessment.").
178. For example, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has
adopted an Environmental Policy that seeks to ensure, through a very detailed
environmental appraisal process, that the projects it finances are environmentally sound
and are designed to operate in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements. See
generally European Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Environmental Policy (2003),
http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/enviro/policy/policy.pdf (last visited Feb 2, 2006).
The Bank's Environmental Policy requires that "[flor projects involving transboundary
impacts, the notification and consultation guidelines in the working papers to the UNECE
Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context must be taken into account in the planning
process and followed in principle." Id. at 20. It further provides that, "[ftor all projects
involving Environmental Impact Assessments according to the Bank's requirements, the
Bank will take guidance from the principles of the UNECE's Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters...." Id. To this end, the EBRD has prepared detailed Environmental
Procedures that provide guidance as to how the environmental appraisal should be
conducted and over 80 sets of Sub-Sectoral Environmental Guidelines covering, for
example, fish processing, logging, stone, sand and gravel extraction, pulp and paper,
hazardous waste management, potable water supplies, etc. See generally id. at
http://www.ebrd.com/about/policies/enviro/procedur/index.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2006).
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governmental organisations, 179 an increasingly sophisticated means of
identifying, understanding, and communicating environmental concerns
is developing that ensures that such concerns can readily be taken into
account by decision makers and policy makers. Numerous international
expert groups, such as the World Water Council (WWC)180 and the
Global Water Partnership (GWP),181 have contributed to the formulation
of guidelines, codes of conduct, or practice standards on the exploitation
of shared water resources that advocate the use of EIA procedures.
Similarly, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), a forum that brought
together representatives of all stakeholders with an interest in dambuilding, including environmental NGOs, reported its conclusions in
182
2000 and proposed 26 protective guidelines for the building of dams.
In particular, the WCD recommended among its Strategic Priorities for
Decision-Making the use of Comprehensive Options Assessment, stating
that "[i]n the assessment process, social and environmental aspects have
the same significance as economic and financial factors. The options
assessment process continues through all stages of planning, project
183
development and operations."
It is somewhat redundant to argue that environmental impact
assessment of projects or activities potentially causing transboundary
harm is not required by law. The obligation to conduct an EIA is
commonly associated with the well established duty to prevent
transboundary harm' 84 and its allied duties to notify and consult with
potentially affected States in relation to any planned projects or activities
that might give rise to such harm. 185 Even those commentators who do
not accept that the requirement to conduct transboundary EIA stems
from the duty to prevent transboundary harm do not argue that the
requirement enjoys no normative status in general international law, but
179. See World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Freshwater, Dams Initiative, Damn Dams!,
http://www.panda.org/dams (last visited May 10, 2006); WWF, Dam Right: WWF's Dams
Initiative, To Dam or Not to Dam? Five Years on from the World Commission on Dams, at
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/2045.pdf (last visited May 10, 2006).
180. A search of the WWC's World Water Actions Inventory, www.worldwater
council.org, found 840 listed actions, campaigns, legal proceedings, policy initiatives, etc.
where the issue of EIA of freshwater projects is central.
181. See Global Water Partnership, GWPToday, http://www.gwpforum.org (last
visited Feb. 2, 2006) (listing numerous technical papers and reports prepared or
commissioned by the GWP).
182.

See WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR

DECISION-MAKING (2000), available at http://www.dams.org//docs/report/wcdintro.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
183. Id.
at 24.
184. See DuPuy, supra note 3, at 66-69.
185.

See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 41, at 131.
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rather that it has developed instead from the application of the principle
of "non-discrimination." 186 The requirement for transboundary EIA has
also been closely linked with practical implementation of the more
general concept of sustainable development 87 and with application of
the precautionary principle. 18 Further, if the due diligence requirement
is the determinative criterion in determining breach of the obligation not
to cause significant harm and, possibly, a key factor in determining the
equity or inequity of a particular regime of utilisation,189 failure to
conduct an adequate EIA is likely, prima facie, to indicate such a breach.
At a more practical level, nearly all infrastructure projects
funded by MDBs or otherwise assisted by international development
agencies are now required to undergo an EIA procedure in order to
assess their potential domestic, transboundary, and global environmental effects. 190 Indeed, in relation to projects for the storage and
diversion of water in transboundary rivers, the WCD expressly
recommends that,
[w]here a government agency plans or facilitates the
construction of a dam on a shared river in contravention of
the principle of good faith negotiations between riparians,
external financing bodies withdraw their support for
projects and programmes promoted by that agency. 191
Given the significance of the EIA procedure for effective
implementation of and compliance with the principle of "good faith
negotiations," it is clear that transboundary EIA will often be required in
practice. This is true, not only of projects provided with financial
assistance by MDBs or other public development agencies, but also of
projects funded by the ten of the world's leading commercial banks that
have so far agreed to abide by the World Bank's voluntary code of
environmental standards when making loans for infrastructural projects
186. Knox, supra note 41, at 296-301.
187. See Sands, supra note 175; Botchway, supra note 169, at 194-214; Ximena Fuentes,
Sustainable Development and the Equitable Utilization of InternationalWatercourses, 69 BRIT.Y.B.
INT'L L. 119, 125-29 (1998).
188. See Owen McIntyre & Thomas Mosedale, The PrecautionaryPrinciple as a Norm of
Customary International Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 221 (1997); Alexandre Kiss, The Rights and
Interests of Future Generations and the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-28 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996).

189.
190.

See Brunn~e & Toope, supra note 30, at 63.
See generally William V. Kennedy, Environmental Impact Assessment and Multilateral

Financial Institutions, in II HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT:
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN PRACTICE: IMPACT AND LIMITATIONS 98 (. Petts

ed., 1999).
191.

WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, supra note 182, at 281.
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in developing countries. 192 Many of these procedures have evolved over
time in terms of their sophistication and thoroughness and now
comprise a de facto corpus of EIA law for States wishing to avail of such
assistance.1 93 However, these rules impact more on developing than
developed countries. A survey published recently by The Economist
points out that in developed countries a great deal of water
infrastructure has already been built and, thus, most disputes over
international watercourses are likely to arise among developing
countries as most future development is likely to take place in less
developed countries. 94 Charles Okidi estimated in 1988 that, though
Africa possesses about one-third of the world's hydropower potential, it
currently generates only two percent, 195 while in 1992 he estimated that
"at present Africa cultivates approximately 24 percent of its available
agricultural land." 196 Lending for large dams alone accounts for about
ten per cent of the World Bank's lending portfolio. The Bank's very
considerable influence on States in the area of international freshwater
policy is evidenced by its role in brokering a compact agreed upon by
the ten States of the Nile Basin. 97 Many other development agencies and
192. World This Week, THE ECONOMIST, June 7, 2003, at 7.
193. For the current World Bank rules on EIA, see WORLD BANK, Environmental
Assessment, in THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL: OPERATIONAL POLIcY 4.01 (Jan.
1999). For an overview of the rule on EIA required for development projects funded by the
Asian Development Bank, see John A. Boyd, Reports from Organizations,4 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
L. 528, 528-34 (1993). For a similar overview covering the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, see Gregory Rose, Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.L., id. at 534-40; for
the European Investment Bank, see id. at 540-43; for the Inter-American Development
Bank, see Dana V. Martin, Y.B. INT'L ENvTL. L., id. at 544-50.
194. Priceless:A Survey of Water, THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 9 (special insert). To
illustrate, the survey points out that the United States has 7,000 cubic metres of water
storage capacity per head of population, while South Africa has 700, the rest of Africa has
25, and Kenya has four. Id. at 10. Similarly, Ethiopia has exploited an estimated three
percent of its hydropower potential while the figure for Japan is 90 percent. Id. In order to
illustrate further the urgency of the need to improve water infrastructure in developing
countries, the survey points out that "[a]s much as 60% of the world's illness is waterrelated." Id. at 5. In 2000, investment in water in developing countries was estimated to be
running at between $75-80 billion, and a group established under the auspices of the WWC
and the GWP suggested that, in order to meet the development goals agreed to at the
Johannesburg Earth Summit in August 2002, investment would have to be raised to around
$180 billion. Id. "During the 1990s, an estimated [U.S.] $32-46 billion was spent annually on
large dams, four-fifths of it in developing countries." WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, supra
note 182, at 48.
195. C.O. Okidi, The State and the Management of InternationalDrainageBasins in Africa, 28
NAT. RESoURCES J. 645, 649, tbl. 1 (1988).
196. Okidi, supra note 27, at 148.
197. See generally Nile Basin Initiative, http://www.nilebasin.org (last visited May 10,
2006) ("provid[ing] a forum for cooperative development of the water resources of the Nile
River").
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even donor States contribute significantly to water projects and thus can
ensure that environmental considerations are fully taken into account by
requiring EIA. 198 Ultimately, one leading commentator concludes that,
"[iln practice, many least-developed countries conduct EIA for projects
only when it is required as a condition of international aid." 199 As well as
providing a means for the discharge of the duty to prevent
transboundary harm and the duty to co-operate and for the practical
implementation of the precautionary principle and the concept of
sustainable development, EIA is very widely used by MDBs and other
development agencies to ensure that considerations of environmental
protection are fully taken into account in the planning of projects
enjoying their support. This de facto requirement to conduct an EIA
provides a more or less formal process for facilitating the consideration
of environmental impacts, which is rather more than exists for any of the
other factors, even those relating to vital human needs, which occupy a
special position by virtue of Article 10(2). The very existence of a formal
procedure can only help to ensure that environmental considerations
"punch above their weight" in the process of balancing competing
interests. Also, consistent use by States of the EIA procedure and its
widespread adoption into domestic legislation can only add to the stock
of international State practice supporting the proposition that the
requirement to conduct transboundary EIA has become a norm of
customary international law.
C. International Commissions
It is, of course, very difficult to study empirically the relative
significance attached to environmental factors in State practice relating to
the utilisation of international watercourses as such practice will often
take place at a confidential and unrecorded diplomatic level. Therefore,
198. For example, the share of British overseas development aid going to water projects
has ranged between 3.5 and 5 percent from 1997 to 2002. Priceless:A Survey of Water, supra
note 194, at 5. On April 23, 2003, the Commission of the European Union put forward
proposals to Member States for the establishment of a E1 billion water fund for the
purposes of assisting African, Caribbean and Pacific (APC) countries in achieving the goals
set out in the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. The fund
would operate under the European Development Fund (EDF) and would provide finance
for sustainable water-related projects and activities. Martin Hedemann-Robinson,
Commission Proposalfor New EU Water Fundfor ACP Countries, 11 ENVTL. LIAB. CS25 (2003).
199. Knox, supra note 41, at 297 n.43. See also CHRISTOPHER WOOD, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 303 (1995); Clive George, ComparativeReview
of Environmental Assessment Procedures and Practice, in ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IN
DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES: PRINCIPLES, METHODS AND PRACTICE 35, 49

(Norman Lee & Clive George eds., 2000).
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it is useful to examine the practice of the many international joint
commissions established to facilitate inter-governmental agreement in
river basin planning and utilisation. Such bodies vary greatly in terms of
their composition and function but almost all possess considerable
technical skills and resources and operate under an express mandate to
further the environmental protection of the international watercourse
and, possibly, the wider natural environment. This trend has become
more marked in recent years. For example, the 1994 Agreements on the
Protection of the Rivers Meuse and Scheldt created an international
commission to facilitate co-operation between the parties for the
purposes of the environmental protection of the rivers. 200 Similarly, the
1994 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use
of the Danube River 201 established an international commission 20 2 to
ensure co-operation in order to "at least maintain and improve the
current environmental and water quality conditions of the Danube River
and of the waters in its catchment area and to prevent and reduce as far
as possible adverse impacts and changes occurring or likely to be
caused." 2°3 The Danube Commission has more specific functions
including, where appropriate, the establishment of emission limits
applicable to individual industrial sectors, the prevention of the release
20 4
of hazardous substances, and the definition of water quality objectives.
The practice of the U.S.-Canada International Joint Commission
(IJC) is particularly instructive as it is one of the longest established such
agencies and provides a comprehensive body of recorded examples of
the consideration of environmental impacts in the context of the use of
shared freshwaters. 2°5 The IJC was established by the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty 2°6 for the purpose of issuing orders of approval in
response to applications for the use, obstruction, or diversion of the
shared boundary waters that may affect the natural water levels or
flows. 2°7 The IJC may also investigate specific issues if so requested by

200. Agreements on the Protection of the Rivers Meuse and Scheldt, Belg.-Fr.-Neth.,
Apr. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 851, 851,859, Art. 2(2).
201. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube
River, (June 29, 1994), http://eelink.net/-asilwildlife/DanubeConvention.html
(last
visited Feb. 25, 2006).
202. Id. art. 18.
203. Id. art. 2(2).
204. Id. art. 7.
205. See Fuentes, supra note 187, at 150-55.
206. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Between the United
States and Canada, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 11, 1909, 102 BRrr. & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 137, art. VII,
available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/water.html.
207. Id. arts. IlI, IV.
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both States. 2°8 For example, in 1975 the State parties requested that the
IJC examine and report on the transboundary implications of the
proposed completion and operation of the Garrison Diversion scheme in
the State of North Dakota and make recommendations in relation to
modifications, alterations, or adjustments that might assist in meeting
the obligations of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty. The Treaty provides that
the boundary waters shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of
health or property on the other.209 The Governments of Canada and
Manitoba objected to the project, inter alia, on the ground that it would
adversely affect water quality as well as fish and wildlife resources in
Manitoba by the transfer of foreign biota.210 The IJC concluded that the
project as originally envisaged by the United States would cause injury
to health and property in Canada as a result of adverse impacts on the
water quality and the biological resources of Manitoba 21 and that
domestic, industrial, and agricultural uses of boundary waters in the
Province would be detrimentally affected. 212 The IJC concluded generally
that, although most of the adverse impacts could be mitigated, the risks
of possible biota transfers were so serious that the only acceptable
solution was to delay the construction of those features of the project that
could result in such transfers. 213 Thus, the IJC was effectively adopting
an "ecosystems approach" to consider the potential adverse impacts of
the project. Similarly, in 1977, the State parties requested that the IJC
examine and report upon the water quality of the Poplar River,
including the transboundary water quality implications of
the thermal power station of the Saskatchewan Power
Corporation and its ancillary facilities, including coalmining, at a site near Coronach, Saskatchewan, and to
make recommendations which would assist Governments
in ensuring that the provisions of Article IV of the said
214
[1909] Treaty are honoured.
The Commission found that the resulting reduction in the
quantity of water crossing the boundary was expected to have an
adverse effect on the existing biological community in the East Fork of
208.

Id. art. IX.

209.

INT'L JOINT COMM'N, TRANSBOUNDARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE GARRISON DIVERSION

UNIT 130-31 (1977).
210. See generally Fuentes, supra note 187, at 150-55 (examining other "[tireaties that
prohibit pollution in so far as it damages specific interests mentioned by the treaty").
211. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, supra note 209, at 3.
212. Id. at 59.
213. Id. at 114.
214.

INT'L JOINT COMM'N, WATER QUALITY IN THE POPLAR RIvER BASIN 210 (1981).

Winter 20061

CUSTOMARY RULES AND PRINCIPLES

the Poplar River and, though this did not amount to pollution for the
purposes of violation of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty, the Commission
suggested that this detrimental effect should nevertheless be taken into
account by the governments. 215 Once again, the IJC appears to have
taken an expansive view of the environmental impacts of the project
based on an "ecosystems approach."
Between December 1984 and February 1985, the IJC was
requested to examine and report upon the water quality and quantity
implications of the proposed coal mine development on Cabin Creek in
British Columbia near its confluence with the Flathead River and to
make recommendations that would assist Governments in ensuring that
the provisions of Article IV of the said treaty are honoured. 216 The
Commission concluded unequivocally that the development would
pollute the waters of the Flathead River and have a serious impact on its
fisheries, and thus, that the effects of the proposed coal mine would
217
constitute a breach of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty.
The potential role of such joint bodies has been considerably
augmented by their express mention in a number of important
framework conventions relating to international watercourses. Though it
does not require the establishment of international joint commissions,
the 1997 U.N. Convention expressly recognises the valuable role they can
play by providing under Article 8, which contains the general duty to cooperate, that
[iun determining the manner of such cooperation,
watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint
mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by
them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and
procedures in the light of experience gained through
cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions
218
in various regions.
Such joint mechanisms or commissions would be particularly
useful in giving effect to the specific measures and methods for
preventing, reducing, and controlling pollution of an international
watercourse suggested under Part IV of the Convention. 219 Indeed, the
215.

Id. at xiii, 197.

216. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED COAL MINE IN THE
FLATHEAD RIVER BASIN 3 (1988).

217. Id. at 8-9.
218. U.N. Convention, supra note 1, at 707, art. 8(2).
219. For example, Article 21(3) proposes that watercourse States introduce the following
measures and methods:
(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria;
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2000 Southern African Development Community (SADC) Revised
Protocol on Shared Watercourses, which was adopted largely to give
effect to key provisions contained in the 1997 U.N. Convention, 220 sets
out a very detailed institutional framework for its implementation. 221 In
contrast to the 1997 U.N. Convention, Article 9 of the 1992 ECE Helsinki
Convention, which concerns bilateral and multilateral co-operation,
expressly requires that bilateral or multilateral agreements or other
arrangements entered into by the parties pursuant to the Convention
"shall provide for the establishment of joint bodies."222 Article 9(2)
goes
on to provide a comprehensive list of tasks that these joint bodies shall
undertake, including the collection of data and exchange of information
on pollution sources likely to cause transboundary impact, the
elaboration of joint monitoring programmes and of joint emission limits
and water quality objectives.
Article 9 further provides for the participation of non-riparian
coastal States "directly and significantly affected by transboundary
impact" in the activities of multilateral joint bodies established by
riparians22 and for the co-ordination of the activities of joint bodies
where two or more exist in the same catchment area. 224 Indeed, the 1992
Convention even provides a definition of a "joint body," which it
describes as "any bilateral or multilateral commission or other
appropriate institutional arrangements for cooperation between the
Riparian Parties." 2
By creating a technically competent inter-governmental body
with responsibility for identifying in detail the adverse environmental
effects of any ongoing or planned use of an international watercourse,
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point
and non-point sources;
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the
waters of an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited,
investigated or monitored.
Id. at 710.
220. The Revised Protocol incorporates all the key substantive provisions contained in
the 1997 Convention. Its Preamble expressly refers to the Convention, stating at
1,
"Bearing in mind the progress with the development and codification of international
water law initiated by the Helsinki Rules and that the United Nations subsequently
adopted the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses." Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 317 (2001).
221. See id. art. 5.
222. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, supra note 78, at 1319, art. 9(2) (emphasis added).
223. See id. at 1319-20, arts. 9(3), 9(4).
224. Id. at 1320, art. 9(5).
225. Id. at 1315, art. 1(5).
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and a formal procedural mechanism for presenting its findings and
recommendations in this regard, the increasingly common practice of
establishing international joint commissions almost inevitably serves to
bring environmental considerations to the fore. Of course, such
commissions may have regard to or assist in the preparation of
Environmental Impact Statements as part of a formal transboundary EIA
process.
D. Custom
Though debate rages about the status in customary international
law of various rules and principles of international environmental law, it
is almost beyond argument that new binding customary norms have
emerged in relation to protection of the environment. In the GabtikovoNagymaros case, the ICJ confirmed that new environmental norms and
standards have emerged that must be taken into account when States
consider projects or activities that might involve adverse environmental
impacts.

226

The Court stated:

Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other
reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this
was often done without consideration of the effects upon
the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a
growing awareness of the risks for mankind-for present
and future generations -of pursuit of such interventions at
an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of
instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have
to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given
proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities
227
but also when continuingwith activities begun in the past.

The Court proceeded to recognise that many of these environmental
norms and standards are included within the concept of sustainable
development.2m
The lack of hierarchical ranking among the factors relevant to
equitable utilisation came under serious challenge in the deliberations of
the General Assembly Working Group on the 1997 Convention from
those "environmentally-minded delegations desirous of having the
importance of the new standards and principles of international
226.
227.
228.

Gab~lkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Feb. 1997).
Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
Id.
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environmental law adequately reflected in the articles of the Convention
concerning equitable utilisation." 229 Indeed, the Finnish delegation
proposed inserting an introduction to the chapeau for Article 6 of the
Convention that stated:
1. Utilisation of an international watercourse in an
equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of
Article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors
and circumstances with a view to attaining sustainable
development of the watercourseas a whole. Special regard should
be given to vital human needs. Relevant factors and
circumstancesshall include:...230
While this principle was strongly supported by those States that sought
to introduce substantive standards for the environmentally sound
application of the equitable utilisation principle, a number of delegations
strongly objected to it,23 1 and "it is most likely that their negative attitude
was dictated by the fear that prominence might be given to
environmental standards in the context of the equitable utilisation
23 2
principle."
Interestingly, Article 10(1) of the 1997 U.N. Watercourses
Convention expressly provides that, "[i]n the absence of agreement or
custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse enjoys
inherent priority over other uses." 23 3 Article 10 concerns competing uses
of water rather than the factors that must be considered in determining a
regime for the equitable and reasonable utilisation of a watercourse.
However, it could be argued that any use that is inconsistent with a rule
or principle of customary international environmental law should be
accorded less priority than any use consistent with customary
international environmental law.
Even though Tanzi and Arcari suggest that "[o]ne can discern
from the ILC travaux prparatoiresthat the word 'custom' in Article 10 is
intended to refer to that formal source of international law known as
'local,' "special' or 'regional' custom, which is much closer to the concept
229. ATTILA TANZI & MAURIZIO ARCARI, THE UNITED NATIONS CoNvENTION ON THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: A FRAMEWORK FOR SHARING 125-26 (2001). Such

delegations included those from Finland, Portugal, Hungary, the Netherlands, and
Germany. Id. at 126 n.127.
230. Id. at 125 n.125.
231. See, e.g., Statement by the Chinese delegation, U.N. General Assembly, 6th Comm.,
Summary Record of the 16th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/SR.16 (1996), at 2. See also
TANZI & ARCARI, supra note 229, at 126.
232. TANZi & ARCARI, supranote 229, at 126.
233. U.N. Convention, supra note 1, at 707, art. 10(1) (emphasis added).
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of tacit agreement than general customary law," 234 the case could
certainly be made that customary rules and principles may be considered
in determining which uses of an international watercourse might be
preferred. Therefore, environmental factors could be given added weight
through the interpretation of emerging rules of customary international
environmental law.
Further, as is the case with EIA, many emerging norms and
principles of customary international environmental law are likely to
enjoy informal implementation through the policies and practices of
MDBs and other international development agencies. This is particularly
true in the case of the duty to co-operate and its component duties to
notify and consult. It must be borne in mind, however, that new or
emerging norms of international environmental law will rarely, if ever,
involve absolute obligations. For the purposes of the determination of an
equitable regime of shared freshwater utilisation in particular, such
environmental norms must be viewed through the dual prisms of due
diligence and proportionality. 235 Therefore, the issue of adequate
implementation of or compliance with norms such as the duty to prevent
transboundary environmental harm must be considered having regard
to the reasonableness of a State's behaviour in light of all the relevant
circumstances. Only then might the fact of non-compliance be
considered as a material factor in the determination of an equitable
regime.
Possibly the single most important element in facilitating the
effective consideration of environmental values within the equitable
balancing process is the extent of the detailed elaboration of
environmental rules and principles in recent years and their consequent
degree of normative specificity and sophistication. In terms of
substantive rules, one needs only to consider the ongoing, organic
development of environmental due diligence standards that underpin
the duty of prevention of significant harm and that could be found to
exist in relation to a wide range of activities, of types of plant and
equipment, of protective or preventive works, of technical studies and
assessments, and so on. Similarly, one needs only to consider the
comprehensive set of procedures and standards that could be found in
relation to the conduct of an EIA. Such detailed procedures and
standards now exist in relation to literally dozens of industry sectors and
categories of activity as well as to various classes of habitat and
234. TANZI & ARCARI, supra note 229, at 137. On "local," "special," or "regional" custom,
see Anthony A. D'Amato, The Concept of Special Custom in International Law, 63 AM. J. INT'L
L. 211 (1969).
235. See, e.g., Kroes, supra note 63, at 94-95,97.
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ecosystem. In terms of procedural rules, one has only to think of the
detailed elaboration of guidance on the duty of watercourse States to
consult in relation to the adoption of environmental measures under
Article 21(3) of the 1997 Convention. It is contended that, by formalising
the values, means, and procedures by which questions of environmental
protection are to be considered within the framework of equitable
utilisation, the parallel and independent development of a complex but
interrelated corpus of environmental rules and principles performs a
vital function in ensuring that such questions are indeed so considered.
While disparaging what she considers to be the disproportionate, and
possibly inequitable, pre-eminence of environmental considerations
(over developmental considerations) within applications of the concept
of sustainable development and in the allocation of transboundary
natural resources, Fuentes suggests that it is possible "to explain the
advantageous position that environmental concerns are gaining, as
compared to the slow pace of the developmental aspects of sustainable
development, by emphasizing the inadequacies of the international lawmaking process in the fields of international economic and cooperation
law." 23 6 This suggests that the effectiveness of the international lawmaking process in the field of environmental law is to some degree
responsible for the priority being accorded to environmental concerns.

236.

Fuentes, supra note 152, at 112.

